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"What matters in all things is usage." 
Sarakhsi, The Book of Sale (llth Century) 
In the contemporary civil law of obligations, a "Middle Eastern style" 
could perhaps be identified as a patchwork of European and local tra- 
ditions with a language and a terminology sometimes derived from 
classical Islamic law, fiqh.1 This is not the case for commercial law. 
Whether from an institutional and technical perspective, or whether 
in the language proper, Middle Eastern commercial law as found in 
legislation or court cases reads for both practitioners and scholars as 
a direct transposition of European law. A long-standing tradition of a 
civilization closely associated with trade seems irrelevant for the 
present commercial law of the area. 
A brief presentation of commercial law decisions across the Arab 
world is sufficient to show the dominance of western principles in the 
field, and the direct translation of western terminology and rules for 
local transactions.2 The decisions have been regrouped in categories 
which will be familiar to the commercial lawyer, and offer ample il- 
lustration of the large-scale borrowing from western commercial law. 
JUDGMENTS 
Syria. Quality of merchant. The Court of Cassation in Syria upheld a 
decision of the Bar of Lattaquie (North-West Syria) to debar a lawyer 
who was carrying on commercial activities whilst registered as a law- 
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1. This is elaborated in a study of civil law, chapter 4 of my forthcoming An Introduction to Middle Eastern Law. 
2. The following survey of court decisions is selected from some one hundred 
commercial law reports from the Arab world, published between 1984 and 1997 in al- 
Majalla al-'arabiyya lil-fiqh wal-qada' (The Arab journal of jurisprudence and courts, hereinafter MAFQ), in seventeen volumes. Originally published in Morocco, the jour- 
nal moved to Cairo, where editing, distribution and updating of the journal became 
poorer. Decisions are cited here first by the country in which the judgment was is- 
sued, then by the court appellation, date of the decision, journal issue and date, and 
page. 
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yer in contradiction with the Bar Association regulations. It held that 
the excuse of continuing his father's commercial practice was not rel- 
evant and that his inscription in the commercial registry was evi- 
dence which he did not rebut, and which, following previous decisions 
by the same Court of Cassation, established him as merchant before 
the law.3 
Bahrain. Quality of merchant. The quality of merchant, and hence 
the possibility of declaring bankruptcy, was conferred by the 
Bahraini Higher Court of Appeal to an Indian resident of Bahrain, 
who was not entitled as foreigner to enlist in the register of com- 
merce, but who was considered nonetheless a merchant in view of his 
trading activities. The Court reversed a court of appeal decision 
which considered that the person in question was a prete-nom for 
other companies, and was as such not entitled to benefit from the 
regime accorded to merchants. The Higher Court of Appeal stated: 
"The fact that the appellant [the Indian resident] was not of Bahraini 
citizenship and thus forbidden from practising commerce in Bahrain, 
and that subsequently he was not able to register in the commercial 
register does not prevent him being considered a merchant if the 
legal elements necessary [to establish the quality of merchant] are 
present. Article 9 of the Bahraini Code of Commerce considers a 
merchant any person having the capacity of merchant and taking as 
a matter of trade a commercial operation in his name and for his own 
benefit." Even if he operated in some cases for the actual benefit of 
others, "this does not affect his quality as merchant, which he ac- 
quired by effectively engaging in commerce in his name. According to 
Art. 18/2 of the Code of Commerce, the quality of merchant is estab- 
lished for whomever practises trade under a prete-nom or hides be- 
hind another person, in addition to his establishment [as merchant] 
on a personal basis."4 
Kuwait. Quality of merchant. The High Court of Appeal of Kuwait 
examined in a long decision the problems relating to the acts of com- 
merce and the quality of merchant. The case involved several legal 
principles established by the court, some of which obiter. The facts of 
the case are complicated, and the decision not very clear. It brings 
together three commercial appeals over a dispute between heirs to a 
large piece of land and contenders to at least part of the land because 
of an operation of sale to merchants with an apparent view to a quick 
profit after division of the estate and resale. The court rejected all 
three appeals, and confirmed the original owners in their ownership, 
also confirming compensation to the purchaser at the time the debt is 
3. Al-Jumhuriyya al-'arabiyya al-suriyya (Syrian Arab Republic), Mahkamat al- 
naqd (court of cassation), 6 june 1985, MAFQ 12, 1992, 205. 
4. Dawlat al-Bahrain (State of Bahrain), Mahkamat al-isti'naf al-'ulya (higher 
appeals court), 3 january 1987, MAFQ 11, 1992, 334, at 336. 
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owed, which the court equated with the time the original suit was 
brought up. With regard to the specific commercial dimension of the 
dispute, the Kuwaiti Court of Cassation also confirmed the lower 
court in its objective appreciation of the quality of merchant on the 
basis of the mercantile nature of the deal over the land: "Appreciation 
of the quality of merchant can be established by all types of legal evi- 
dence. . . The establishment of the mercantile nature of a transaction 
is of the exclusive competence of the court of fact and there is no con- 
trol over it."5 
Jordan. Liability. Port Authority. A finely argued decision of the 
Jordanian Court of Cassation held that the liability of a port author- 
ity for the loss of merchandise was part of its duties as carrier of this 
merchandise within the precinct of the port and could not be removed 
by an argument of force majeure derived from its loss because of theft. 
An Iraqi cargo had unloaded six containers into the port of 'Aqaba. 
Two containers went missing, and a criminal inquiry was in progress. 
The Port Authority was asked to compensate the cargo liner in full by 
the first instance court and the Court of Appeal. The Port Authority 
appealed before the Court of Cassation on the ground that the trans- 
port of the goods in the containers into the silos of the Port was not 
part of the operation of transport. The Court demurred, on the basis 
of the unity of the operation. The appellant also argued the necessity 
to wait for the result of the enquiry as penal law ties civil and com- 
mercial law. The Court rejected the argument as the inquest's objec- 
tive was to look for possible thieves, and considered that its result 
was irrelevant to the liability of the Port Authority. Indeed, either the 
thieves were employees of the port and the Port Authority was re- 
sponsible for them following Art. 288 of the Civil Code, or they were 
foreign to both parties, and liability for the safety of the merchandise 
was entirely incumbent on the Port Authority.6 
Bahrain. Liability. Duty of care. This was a case of goods transported 
in a container which had been seriously damaged. The Court of Cas- 
sation upheld the decisions of the lower courts (in first instance, al- 
mahkama al-sughra, because of the small amount involved, ca 600 
dinars, then the upper court, al-mahkama al-kubra). Lower courts 
had awarded the money to the plaintiff - an insurance company, 
which had paid the insured merchant for receiving the damaged 
goods, and substituted itself for his claim against the defendant - a 
maritime carrier. The courts at all levels agreed that the Bahraini 
Maritime code does not absolve the carrier from his duty to look after 
5. Dawlat al-Kuwait (State of Kuwait), Mahkamat al-isti'naf al-'ulya, da'irat al- 
tamyiz (higher appeals court, section of cassation), 26 march 1986, MAFQ 16, 1994, 314 at 324. 
6. Al-Mamlaka al-urduniyya al-hashimiyya (the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan), Mahkamat al-tamyiz (court of cassation), 19 january 1987, MAFQ 11, 1992, 327. 
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the merchandise carried, notwithstanding any clause to the contrary 
in the contract of transportation. The Court of Cassation noted that 
"the carton boxes had been seen inside the container in the normal 
and usual way in the commercial field," and that the argument of the 
carrier that the merchandise had delivered the container in good 
shape did not suffice to curtail his liability.7 
Tunisia. Liability. Damaged goods. A decision of the Tunisian Court 
of Cassation confirmed the responsibility of the carrier toward the 
buyer in case of damage to merchandise carried by sea on the basis of 
Art. 146 of the Code of Maritime Commerce, which stipulates that 
"any damage to the merchandise is supposed to have taken place be- 
tween possession and delivery so long as the carrier does not provide 
evidence otherwise." The carrier, said the Court, did not rebut the 
presumption, and the stevedore to whom the carrier was imputing 
responsibility is not liable "so long as the maritime carrier did not 
prove that the merchandise was in good condition when delivered to 
the stevedore."8 
Syria. Liability. Air carrier. In a long decision, the Court of Cassation 
confirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeal establishing the re- 
sponsibility of a German air carrier for refusing to fulfil its obliga- 
tions of transporting the petitioner, a sick man who was coming back 
from New York to Damascus. The passenger had boarded the plane 
with a medic and a special bed, and was summoned by the captain to 
unboard. The man died a few days later. Several legal aspects were 
addressed by the court which fall outside the commercial field proper: 
in the law of obligations, the remoteness of damage, in the law of 
conflict, the competence of the Syrian court on the basis of French 
precedents, and in the law of evidence and procedure, expert reports 
and the review of the evidence produced by the lower court. In the 
commercial field, the responsibility of the air carrier was established 
under the 1929 Warsaw convention. The airline, the court concluded, 
did not fulfill its obligations under the transport contract notwith- 
standing internal directives of the company allowing the captain of 
the plane to refuse boarding to a seriously ill passenger.9 
Kuwait. Liability. Air carrier. The Warsaw convention was also the 
main reference in a decision of the Kuwaiti court of cassation which 
established the responsibility of an air carrier for goods perishing in 
the custody of customs at the airport. The court confirmed that liabil- 
ity started from receipt and ended only upon delivery. This did not 
7. Dawlat al-Bahrain (State of Bahrain), Mahkamat al-tamyiz (court of cassa- 
tion), 10 june 1990, MAFQ 12, 1992, 202 at 203, 204. 
8. Al-Jumhuriyya al-tunisiyya (Tunisian Republic), mahkamat al-ta'qib (court of 
cassation), 3 may 1982, MAFQ 11, 1992, 337 at 339. 
9. Al-Jumhuriyya al-'arabiyya al-suriyya (Syrian Arab Republic), Mahkamat al- 
naqd (court of cassation), 3 march 1987, MAFQ 11, 1992, 340-46. 
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prevent the judges from rejecting contributory negligence and from 
allowing liability to extend jointly and severally to the customs' office, 
so long as evidence did not exonerate that office from its responsibil- 
ity. Solidarity between co-debtors, here the customs office and the air 
carrier, was total, and the victim could sue either for the totality of 
the debt.10 
United Arab Emirates. Commercial instruments. Documentary letter 
of credit. In a procedurally complex decision,"l the Supreme Federal 
Court of the United Arab Emirates established the joint responsibil- 
ity for a documentary letter of credit opened at a bank in solidum, 
even though one of the parties may have established a different rela- 
tionship with the other debtor in the contract of partnership. "The 
bank was not party to the contract between the partners. Its knowl- 
edge of the contents and conditions of the partnership contract or the 
contract leading to its dissolution does not affect the obligation in 
solidum of the appellant with the other appellee since the opening of 
the documentary credit took place after the contract establishing the 
partnership." There was no obligation on the part of the bank "so long 
as the bank did not accept absolving the joint debtor from the obliga- 
tion contracted in solidum with his partner. The silence of the bank 
towards these letters is in reality a rejection of these arguments, es- 
pecially since the appellant did not ask the bank for a remittance of 
the debt and the full discharging of the liability for the documentary 
credit to remain with [his partner]."12 
Jordan. Commercial instruments. Endorsement. In a brief decision, 
the Jordanian Court of Cassation rejected the appeal of an endorser 
who had issued an endorsement carrying on the bill the mention 
"value of guarantee," and held that the Code of Commerce did not 
make any difference between the original debtor and the guarantor in 
this respect: This was a guarantee endorsement, said the Court, 
"which like the usual endorsement, establishes transfer of prop- 
10. Dawlat al-Kuwait (State of Kuwait), Mahkamat al-isti'naf al-'ulya, da'irat al- 
tamyiz (higher appeals court, section of cassation), 13 february 1985, MAFQ 11, 1992, 349-53. For another decision in this field, translated in English in full, and mainly based on the Warsaw convention, see Dr. Najeeb Al-Nuaimi v. Gulf Air, decided by the court of Appeal of Doha, 9 june 1993, in E. Cotran & C. Mallat (eds.), Yearbook of Islamic and Middle Eastern Law i, 558-64 (1994). (In a case of overbooked flights, the 
court awarded "full compensation," set at 150,000 riyals (1 USD = 3.6 Qatari riyals in 
1995), by air carrier to first class passenger and his family, who were unable to board 
the plane, for "loss of gain or the result of loss, and moral and material damage," at 
564). 
11. Dawlat al-imarat al-'arabiyya al-muttahida (United Arab Emirates), Al- 
mahkama al-ittihadiyya al-'ulya (federal supreme court), 9 december 1987, MAFQ 
11, 1992, at 331. 
12. Id., at 333. 
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erty.. . The person to whom endorsement was made can ask for the 
full value of the bill when due."13 
United Arab Emirates. Commercial instruments. Cheque.14 The Na- 
tional Bank of Abu Dhabi had brought action against a client for un- 
paid debts, and had received a judgment in its favour in first instance 
and on appeal. The defendant brought in the meantime another ac- 
tion against the bank for withholding twenty-two cheques made to 
his order, the value of which (some 2,623,0000 dirhams; 1 USD 1995 
= 3.7 UAE dirhams) amounted to a sum far beyond the compensation 
granted to him in the previous judgment. The bank argued that final 
decision had already been made by the other court, but the second 
court carried on and delivered judgment against the client. On ap- 
peal, the Court of Appeal of Abu Dhabi held that the cheques were 
considered as a guarantee up to the value of the client's debt. It also 
appointed an expert to see whether the withholding by the bank of 
the cheque was acceptable "under the customs of banking."15 The ex- 
pert concluded to the irregularity of the bank's practice in the case, as 
it should have carried on cashing the cheques, even if it knew that 
there was no adequate provision, but the Court of Appeal decided 
nonetheless for the bank on the ground that "the bank has two quali- 
ties: first, it is an agent for the purposes of cashing the cheques de- 
posited with it, and, secondly, it is a pledged creditor benefiting from 
the cheque as security."16 The bank was therefore not liable for refus- 
ing to cash the cheque as it knew, notwithstanding the report of the 
expert, that there was no provision for the cheques deposited. 
The defendant appealed in cassation before the Supreme Federal 
Court, which brought together the various actions and procedural in- 
cidents. At issue, the court held, were five pleas from the appellant. It 
proceeded by rejecting four of them, while reversing the decision on 
one count. 
The first argument was the wrong appreciation by the lower 
courts of the nature of the cheques and the expert's report. The 
Supreme Court saw that the practice of the bank was not irregular, 
that it was natural that the bank would credit the client's account 
upon receipt of the cheques, and that it would proceed back and debit 
them if it turns out there were insufficient funds. The cheque was to 
be considered therefore as prima facie security. 
The legal qualification of the cheque provided also a second and 
third arguments for the appellant, who claimed that no security could 
13. Al-Mamlaka al-urduniyya al-hashimiyya (the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan), Mahkamat al-tamyiz (court of cassation), 3 july 1991, MAFQ 14, 1993, 253, at 254. 
14. Dawlat al-imarat al-'arabiyya al-muttahida (United Arab Emirates), al- 
mahkama al-ittihadiyya al-'ulya (federal supreme court), MAFQ 14, 1993, 256-62. 
15. Id., at 258, "hasb al-'urf al-masrif." 
16. At 259. 
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be made to affect a cheque under Art. 1449 of the Law on Civil Trans- 
actions, which requires that the object of security must be capable of 
being sold in auction. Again, the court rejected the argument, holding 
that nothing prevents cheques from being considered as possessory 
pledges with a bank. The appellant claimed further that there were 
contradictions between the qualification of the decisions of the vari- 
ous appeal courts. The Supreme Court saw otherwise, explaining 
that the bank was operating in various capacities, but that they were 
all premised on the concept of cheque as security for the client's debt. 
A fourth plea of the appellant in cassation to the effect of a con- 
tradiction between the decisions of the Court of appeal as to the qual- 
ification of the cheque deposited with the bank was also rejected. "It 
is not necessary for the pledgee bank," the Federal Supreme Court 
held, "to return some of the cheques and to hold on only to the 
amount of the debt, since the money deposited as security must be 
considered one complete unit to guarantee the debt and is often supe- 
rior to that debt."17 
However, the court held for the client on one count. It held the 
bank liable for not carrying the procedure for bad cheques to its judi- 
cial end, notably for two out of the twenty-two cheques deposited, and 
considered that the two cheques, with a value of 150,000 dirhams (ca 
$40,000), "were not a trivial sum" as argued by the bank.18 The re- 
sponsibility of the bank was therefore established to that limited ex- 
tent and the decision remanded down to the Court of Appeal for 
revision. 
Iraq. Commercial instruments. Cheque endorsement. In a short deci- 
sion, the Court of Cassation reversed a lower decision which had an- 
nulled a cheque because of the absence of mention in it of the place of 
its issuing. It based its decision on Art. 185 of the new Iraqi Code of 
Commerce of 1984, which did not stipulate the place of issuing as one 
of the conditions of the cheque's validity.19 
Iraq. Commercial instruments. Notarisation of bill. Prescription. Also 
in a short decision, taken by majority, the Iraqi Court of Cassation 
held that a commercial bill retained its commercial nature even after 
notarisation, and was therefore subject to the period of limitation 
under the Commercial Code.20 
17. At 262. Argument based on comparative laws, "hasb al-qawanin al- 
muqarana." 
18. Id. 
19. Jumhuriyyat al-'iraq (Iraqi Republic), Mahkamat al-tamyiz (court of cassa- 
tion), 28 january 1988, MAFQ 11, 1992, 347-48. 
20. Jumhuriyyat al-'iraq (Iraqi Republic), Mahkamat al-tamyiz (court of cassa- 
tion), 31 july 1990, MAFQ 14, 1993, 268. This must be one of the last decisions of the 
Iraqi Court of cassation before the invasion of Kuwait. 
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United Arab Emirates. Commercial instruments. Debtors' obligation 
in solidum.21 The Federal Supreme Court of Cassation sitting in Abu 
Dhabi, confirmed the decision of the Federal Court of Appeal sitting 
in the Emirate of Sharjah and rejected two pleas by the appellants: 
the first was a plea to disregard joint liability for a commercial bill. 
The second plea demanded the suppression of interest on late pay- 
ment of the debt. On the first plea, the Supreme Court held that even 
if the law did not expressly acknowledge solidarity for a bill, the prac- 
tice of commerce considered such papers to be commercial, and all 
obligors on the paper were jointly liable for discharging them. The 
Court cited the draft Code of Commercial Transactions (which was 
adopted two years after the decision was handed down, in late 
199322) as further argument, even though a bill as such was not in- 
cluded among the commercial papers cited in the Code for joint liabil- 
ity. On the issue of interest, the Court explained that late payment, 
under the principle "delay by the rich is harm,"23 requires compensa- 
tion to the party injured, and that interest on late payment of the 
debt, which had been imposed by the lower courts as compensation, 
was warranted and legal. 
Morocco. Commercial debt. Prescription. Reversing a decision by the 
Court of Appeal of Fes, the Supreme Court of Morocco held that the 
specific time limitation governing a commercial debt is to be found in 
the Commercial Code, Article 189 of which "holds all cases resulting 
from a commercial invoice against the accepting drawee, to be subject 
to a period of three-year time limitation," but that partial payment 
brings an end to the issue of limitation under Art. 152 of the Code. 
The dispositions of the Civil Code were considered irrelevant.24 
Algeria. Preemption in commerce. In a poorly worded decision, the 
Supreme Court of Algeria reversed a Court of Appeal judgment which 
had allowed the exercise of preemption over the transfer of commer- 
cial property - fonds de commerce. The contract between the new 
owner of the fonds de commerce and the original merchant was con- 
sidered void by the Court of Appeal because the transfer had been 
made in the absence of the owner of the building where the commerce 
was located, who was allegedly denied his right to exercise preemp- 
21. Dawlat al-imarat al-'arabiyya al-muttahida (United Arab Emirates), Al- 
mahkama al-ittihadiyya al-'ulya (federal supreme court), 23 december 1992, MAFQ 
15, 1994, 299. 
22. Federal law 18 of 1993, came into force 20 december 1993. For a comprehen- 
sive overview, see Price, "United Arab Emirates," Yearbook of Islamic and Middle Eastern Law 307-29 (1994). 
23. "Matl al-ghaniyy zulm" (hadith), in decision cited supra n. 21, at 302. 
24. Al-Mamlaka al-maghribiyya (Kingdom of Morocco), al-majlis al-a'la (supreme 
court), 7 december 1988, MAFQ 11, 1992, 359-60 at 360. 
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tion. The Supreme Court reversed by affirming the lack of relevance 
of the right of preemption in commercial sales.25 
Libya. Bankruptcy. Directors' responsibility. In a confusing decision 
over a case which seems to have dragged on since before 1969, the 
Supreme Court rejected the applicability of the personal liability of 
directors, as mentioned in Art. 555 of the Commercial code, and the 
necessity to restrict liability to the assets of a bankrupt company. The 
facts seem to support a clear operation of fraud, whereby one or more 
directors of an import company received huge sums for material to be 
imported to Libya, which they put in their private bank accounts. 
Eventually, the company went bankrupt, but the plaintiffs obdu- 
rately requested the examination of the personal responsibility of the 
directors beyond their ownership of shares in the company. While the 
decision of the Court did not appear too convincing in law in view of 
the evidence of fraud, it might be explained by "a letter of the defend- 
ant to the president of the revolutionary council," which clearly ac- 
knowledged the fraud, but which might have acted to deter the 
Supreme Court judges from punishing the rogue director who turned 
out to have strong connections in high places. Articles 554 and 555 of 
the Commercial Code, which hold directors responsible on their own 
fortune for fraud to the company, were set aside by the Court on the 
basis of the bankruptcy process which prevented debtors from pursu- 
ing directors outside the strict bankruptcy procedure.26 
Bahrain. Bankruptcy. Date of appreciation. In a brief decision, the 
Court of Cassation in Bahrain refused to be drawn on the subject of 
assessing the effective date of bankruptcy of a merchant, leaving such 
assessment to the lower courts as an issue of fact.27 
Kuwait. Bankruptcy. Liquidation of limited liability company. A 
plethora of suits and counter-suits had resulted from a dispute be- 
tween a Kuwaiti 51% shareholder in a limited liability company and 
his Syrian partner for 49% of the shares, and the High Court of Ap- 
peal joined all claims in its judgment. The Court held that in case of 
disagreement which prevents the continuation of a limited liability 
company, and in the absence of regulations under the company arti- 
cles of association, the rules under the Commercial Companies Law 
of 1960 require the appointment of a liquidator, who is in charge of 
25. Al-Jumhuriyya al-jaza'iryya al-dimuqratiyya al-sha'biyya (Democratic Popu- lar Republic of Algeria), al-majlis al-a'la (supreme court), 21 january 1984, MAFQ 16, 
1994, 311. 
26. Al-Jamahariyya al-'arabiyya al-libyya al-sha'biyya al-ishtirakiyya al-'uzma (the Great Popular Socialist Arab Libyan Jamahiriyya), al-majlis al-a'la (supreme 
court), 29 october 1984, MAFQ 11, 1992, 354-58. Letter to Mu'ammar al-Qadhdhafi 
mentioned at 356 and 360. 
27. Dawlat al-Bahrain (State of Bahrain), Mahkamat al-tamyiz [?] (court of cassa- 
tion), 28 June 1992, MAFQ 15, 1994, 303. Note the French terms of the Code of 
Bankruptcy and of Concordat Preventif, "qanun al-iflas wal-sulh al-wiqa'i". 
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assessing the dissolved company and of distributing the proceeds of 
the liquidation accordingly. The Court reversed a ruling of the lower 
court which had allowed the distribution of the assets on the basis of 
a balance dated at the start of litigation, and requested the newly 
appointed liquidator to proceed with the allocation of the remaining 
credit to the partners at the date of liquidation.28 
There is little in these examples which a commercial lawyer trained 
in the west will not be comfortable with. Occasionally, as in the 1992 
decision of the Federal Supreme Court of the United Arab Emirates 
on the joint liability of debtors whose signature figures on a commer- 
cial instrument, the issue of riba, 'interest', re-emerges. With the pos- 
sible exception of Saudi Arabia, and recently of Iran, interest is 
invariably upheld.29 
Variations will naturally occur in matters of detail, but the lan- 
guage is one which reads as a straight translation from a western 
commercial code. Plagiarism - or borrowing - runs the gamut of 
the whole field of commercial law, from the objective quality of 
merchant to the mechanisms of bankruptcy, and typically includes 
technical rules on commercial papers, transport liability, and com- 
pany law. The local commercial statutes, and the courts which apply 
them, adopt terminology and categories which are taken straight 
from western practice. The executive, acting as legislator, will also 
ratify and incorporate western-made international conventions in 
which Middle Eastern input is negligible, if not nil. The style of com- 
mercial law in the region is decisively western. 
THE CLASSICAL TRADITION 
The direct bearing of foreign models may have not been necessary to 
that comprehensive extent. It is possible to detect in the misprepared 
and impoverished genesis of Middle Eastern commercial law, the 
prodromes of unease for a forgotten tradition. 
From time to time, the tradition tries to take revenge for this 
disregard, sometimes in a deliberately provocative manner. This is 
most apparent in the recent manifestation of two phenomena which, 
this article will argue, operate as fuite-en-avant: arbitration, and the 
so-called field of "Islamic banking." 
Before we examine the purported unease, a flashback is neces- 
sary to see what commercial law might have meant in Middle East- 
ern history, and to wonder about the possible reasons for the chasm 
between the textual tradition and present legislation. The gap is per- 
plexing because of the importance of commerce in the region, both as 
28. Dawlat al-Kuwait (State of Kuwait), Mahkamat al-isti'naf al-'ulya (higher ap- 
peals court), 10 january 1986, MAFQ 14, 1993, 270. 
29. See further section on Islamic banking infra. 
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reality and as mental social construct, since at least the advent of 
Islam in the sixth century, and the persistence of its importance 
through the classical age. 
Already a hundred years ago an orientalist scholar had noted 
how the domination of commercial terms-of-the-art operates in the 
Qur'an, in tune with what one would expect in a Meccan society 
whose Prophet was a trader by profession.30 
Although an understudied field, what we know of classical com- 
mercial law requires, over the extensive span covered by Islamic law, 
to distil certain characteristics which offer some perspective on the 
present-day relationship between Islam and business.31 
The list of specifications in the Qur'an covering commerce is long: 
it includes contracts, the necessity of their certainty, the central im- 
portance of ethics, the strict requirements of honoring one's obliga- 
tions, of putting them in writing, the importance of trade, in addition 
to the famous sentence in the second chapter explaining how trade 
has been allowed by God, but riba (interest, usury) forbidden.32 
Except for the riba question - and even then there is little which 
is qualitatively different from other Biblical religions -33 the general 
ethical system cannot be labelled as exclusively Islamic. Most 
Qur'anic features are shared by world religions with regard to busi- 
ness and the necessity of ethics in the transactional relations of 
30. C.C. Torrey, The Commercial-Theological Terms in the Koran (1892). Also in 
that early vein, Richard Grasshof, Wechselrecht der Araber (1899), who includes a 
refreshing note on the varieties of Islamic law, at 11-12: "Daher gibt es in Islam so 
viele originale Rechstsysteme als es originale Juristen gibt; und dies sind nicht nur 
die Griinder der vier orthodoxen Schulen neben der Shi'a." 
31. There is a large literature on the subject of classical trade in the Mediterra- 
nean (that is between Europe and the Orient), partly reviewed by Jean-Claude Gar- 
cin, "Le JESHO et la recherche sur l'histoire 6conomique et sociale des pays 
musulmans," Journal of the Economic History of the Orient 36 139-53 (1993). The 
most remarkable archival work was achieved by Samuel Goitein and his disciples. One should also examine works which are less Mediterranean-centered such as, in 
Braudelian fashion, the books of K.N. Chaudhury on Trade Civilisation in the Indian 
Ocean: An Economic History From the Rise of Islam to 1750 (1985); Asia Before Eu- 
rope (1993). In a different, but no less encyclopaedic mode, see the trade tradition in 
South East Asia as portrayed in Denys Lombard, Le carrefour javanais: essai d'histoire globale, 3 vols., (1990), especially volume 2. The identification in the com- 
mon law of Islam of trade patterns, which the French historian Fernand Braudel calls 
long wave or long structure (longue duree), might help understand how fourteen cen- 
turies have come to bear on the world of business in Islam. For this purpose, the law 
of trade is a useful indicator. 
32. "Honour your contracts," v:l, xvii:34; "put your debts in writing," ii:282, "woe to the fraudsters," lxxxiii:1; "God has allowed commerce and prohibited riba," ii:275. 
33. There is understandably a large literature on the subject of "the prohibited 
riba." See for an extensive discussion in 20th century Egypt, my "The debate on riba 
and interest in twentieth century jurisprudence," in C. Mallat (ed.), Islamic Law and 
Finance 69-88 (1988); "Tantawi on banking operations in Egypt," in M. Masud, B. Messick & D. Powers (eds.), Islamic Legal Interpretation: Muftis and Their Fatwas 286-96 (1996), and the references cited therein. John Noonan has written the stan- 
dard treatise on the subject in Canon law, The Scholastic Analysis of Usury (1957). 
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human beings. These are important for the survival of the business 
sanctity of contracts and of morality in any society. In the face of such 
trite fact, and to the extent that it is possible to discover a different 
slant in the documents borne by Islamic law, is there a specificity of 
business in Islam? 
In a long wave perspective, specifically 'Islamic' intellectual and 
practical products can perhaps be summarized in a number of pro- 
positions adduced from classical fiqh texts. 
The central role of trade. The first element is the centrality of trade, 
the universal respect it carries in Muslim civilization, and the impor- 
tance of commerce as the nerve of the city and of regional or interna- 
tional exchange. The free movement of goods is a key element in the 
intellectual structure of early Islam through to the present period. 
The fact that the Prophet Muhammed started his career as a caravan 
merchant is unique to the Islamic Prophecy; the tradition relating to 
the other great monotheistic epigones in the figures of Abraham and 
Jesus does not acknowledge the centrality of trade and commerce in 
any similar way. In the case of Jesus, the episode of the Temple 
merchants even points in the opposite direction, with the mercantile 
pursuit of wealth depicted in a derogatory manner.34 In contrast, the 
original textual tradition of Islam and of Islamic law acknowledges 
the importance of commerce, including the security of long-distance 
trade and market sanctity, both on the ethical and the practical level. 
Whatever the reality of emporia in the early Islamic Hijaz,35 the tra- 
dition of an Islamic Prophet-merchant is firmly received and devel- 
oped across the centuries. Neither classical Christianity or Judaism 
seem to have extolled "the virtues of commerce" in such a detailed nor 
enthusiastic argument for 'the commercial professions' as did 
Dimashqi (llth century CE) in his Mahasin al-tijara.36 Nor is the 
display of legal cogency so remarkable as in the classical jurists' 
34. Matthew, xxi:12; Marc xi:15; Luke xix:45; John ii, 13. See generally J.D.M. 
Derrett, Law in the New Testament xxiii, 278 (1970). 
35. In Meccan Trade and the Rise of Islam (1987), Patricia Crone has cast serious 
doubts on the centrality of trade in South Western Arabia as portrayed in such classi- 
cal theses as Henri Lammens, La cite de Taif d la veille de l'Hegire (1922); La Mecque 
a la veille de l'Hegire (1924). A typical Lammens portrayal is summed up in his L'Islam 21-22 (1944): "[Looking at Mecca at the time of the Prophet], on croit surpren- dre comme le bourdonnement d'une ruche humaine, se trouver aux abords de nos 
Bourses modernes... La Mecque devient le paradis des caravaniers, des courtiers, des 
entremetteurs, des banquiers avec leurs prets d'argent, places a des taux usuraires ou 
paraissant tels a qui refuse de tenir compte des risques 6normes du capital a cette 
epoque et dans ce milieu de nomades insaisissables... Au dire de Strabon, tous les Arabes sont courtiers ou commercants... A la Mecque, 'on ne professait d'estime que 
pour les marchands', man lam yakun tajiran falaysa 'indahum bi-shay' [literally, those who are not merchants are nothing to the Meccans]." 
36. Mahasin al-tijara, (The virtues of commerce) published Cairo 1318 AH, and discussed at length in S.D. Goitein, A Mediterranean Society, 5 vols., 1967-1988, in 
volume 1; and in Claude Cahen, "A propos et autour d"ein arabisches Handbuch der 
Handelswissenschaft'," Oriens 160-71 (1962). 
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treatment of the contract of sale, which is, since early Islam, the mea- 
suring rod for all its "contractual sisters."37 
Sale as paragon transaction. The contract of sale is the paragon of 
contracts in Islamic law, along the lines of which are constructed any 
other contracts. Although there is neither a theory of contract in 
classical Islamic law, nor any general theory of obligations such as in 
late Roman or French law, one does find an elaborate structure of 
Islamic law texts around the book of sales. Here is a typical 
formulation: 
The basis of sale is the exchange of a desired commodity 
against another desired commodity. 
This can be done by word or by deed. 
As for word, this is known as offer and acceptance in the 
tradition of the jurists. 
Treatment of offer and acceptance is twofold: first the 
mode of the offer and acceptance and second the nature of 
the offer and acceptance. 
First the mode: offer and acceptance, we say - and God 
help us to success - could be made in the present or in the 
past mode. 
If in the past mode, then the seller would say 'I have 
sold' and the buyer 'I have bought'. The basis is then com- 
plete since this mode, albeit formulated in the past, consti- 
tutes an immediate offer in the language of lexicologists and 
jurists. Custom is decisive in this regard.38 
This is how Kasani opens up the book of sale in his encyclopaedic 
legal treatise in the 12th century. Strict legal logic then develops with 
the formulation of sale in the past tense, and the reason why use of 
the past tense is considered better: each of these formulas "gives the 
meaning of sale, which is exchange: importance is in the meaning not 
in the expression."39 
This only makes sense in comparison with the alternative modes: 
formulation in the present tense. If the formulation of offer and ac- 
ceptance is in the present tense, the contract is also concluded, but 
this is because the intention to sell and buy is ready and clear for 
both parties, and Kasani is willing to consider both intention and 
general use, which concur. In contrast, he continues, an offer made in 
the form of a question, or in the imperative mode, is not acceptable in 
law, even though it may have been valid for the earlier jurist Shafi'i 
37. Kasani (d.1191), Bada'e' al-Sana'e', Beirut, n.d., v, 167: "wal-bay' wa 
akhawatuhu tubtiluha al-shurut al-fasida" (contract and its sisters are annulled by 
void conditions). 
38. Kasani, v, 133: "...fi 'urf ahl al-lugha wal-shar'. . .al-'urf qadin 'alal-wad'." 39. "Al-'ibra lil-ma'na la lil-sura." Id. 
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(d.820), who had used the contract of marriage as analogy. Why is 
that? 
For Kasani, the rejection of the analogy with marriage is based 
on the specificity of the marriage contract, "in which bargaining is 
unusual." Kasani explains that one could follow in the contract of sale 
the possibility of accepting the conclusion of marriage if the formula 
is, for the guardian of a woman, in the imperative (future) form, "as 
when someone tells the other, 'marry my daughter' and the addressee 
says 'I have', or if one says 'marry your daughter to me' and the ad- 
dressee says 'I have'."40 For Shafi'i, this should be equally valid for a 
formula in the imperative in the case of a sale, on the basis of 
analogy. 
For Kasani, the reason why "analogy has been abandoned" in 
this instance, despite the fact that there is no text to support such 
departure, is because of the process of bargaining which is inherent 
to sale, whereas it would cause embarrassment in the case of mar- 
riage. In the case of a marriage, therefore, acceptance could be issued 
in the future imperative form, or in the form of an acquiescence to a 
question because it would not be right to involve bargaining in the 
process. The fact that the element of bargaining is inherent in the 
case of sale offers enough of a contrast to sharply distinguish the two. 
It is therefore possible to consider offer and acceptance in the form of 
a question and answer, or in the imperative, for the conclusion of 
marriage. Such "imprecision" is not allowed for the conclusion of a 
contract in the case of sale, because it constrains bargaining which is 
of the essence in commerce.41 
While it is not our purpose to present the details of the Islamic 
law of sale, three premises can be said to underlie the system as it 
pertains to trade in classical law: certainty, flexibility and 
pragmatism. 
As for certainty, it is remarkable that, in one single page, Kasani 
repeats five times the need to avoid, in the terms of the contract, "any 
oversight which may be conducive to litigation."42 Through certainty 
is consecrated the fulfilment of the exact intention of the parties as 
also manifested in the meeting of minds in the bargaining session. 
Flexibility is offered through an elaborate system of options, per- 
haps one of the most complex areas of Islamic law, which is dominant 
and crucial for the study of the sale contract. The contract of sale is 
not binding unless "it is clear from four options: the option of specifi- 
cation, the option of condition, the option against defects, and the op- 
40. Id., at 133 bottom. 
41. Id., at 134 top. 
42. "Jahala mufdiya ila niza,"' 209. See also the formula elsewhere in the book, 
e.g., at 198, 207. 
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tion of vision."43 These are conventional or presumed clauses in the 
contract, and allow for several variations within the contract within 
an overall regulatory framework for their 'exercise'.44 
Pragmatism is the third element. We have seen its importance in 
the very definition of sale. Pragmatism is a key component of the Is- 
lamic law merchant through the importance accorded by the jurists 
to custom as a central source and element in the system. Examples 
can be multiplied of striking formulas in which Kasani, like other ju- 
rists, are prepared to abandon strict rules in favor of the merchants' 
customs. 
The importance of custom. A characteristic of the long wave patterns 
of the Islamic law merchant is indeed custom, which plays a vital and 
controversial role, in that it is not generally associated with Islamic 
law, despite its importance for understanding the long-term struc- 
ture of Islamic business. According to the received basic structure of 
"the sources of Islamic law," custom does not figure among the usual 
sources.45 But in the law of sale, custom is "decisive," as in the words 
of Kasani. Nor is that an isolated rendering. A jurist like Sarakhsi (d. 
ca 1095) is no less emphatic: 
If a vendor buys a cloth, he is authorised to include in 
the price what was spent for sewing and transport, but he 
must say, 'This is what it cost me' and not 'I have bought it 
at such a price', because the latter formula would be wrong. 
The murabaha (profit) in that partnership contract, the 'urf, 
the custom of the merchants is taken into account. What 
customary practice authorises in addition to the buying price 
can be added on by the merchant. What practice excludes 
must be excluded.46 
Custom is decisive in the law merchant, and one will find in 
Sarakhsi's Mabsut and many other texts that deal with the book of 
sales and with other contracts in Islamic law a systematic reference 
to trade customs, including 'adat al-tujjar - the use of merchants and 
their practice -; ta'amul al-nas, i.e., the way people deal amongst 
themselves; ta'aruf bayn al-nas, the interaction between people; as 
well as the notion of wajh al-tijara or the direction of commerce. 
These are recurring concepts which provide an overall framework ac- 
43. "An yakun al-'aqd khaliyan 'an khiyarat arba'at, khiyar al-ta'yin, wa khiyar 
al-shart, wa khiyar al-'ayb wa khiyar al-ru'ya, fala yalzam ma'a ahadin min hadhih 
al-khiyarat," 228. 
44. For a discussion in English of the options' regime, Noel Coulson, Commercial Law in the Gulf States 56-74 (1984); S.E. Rayner, The Theory of Contracts in Islamic Law 305-351 (1991) and her references. 
45. Further discussion in chapter 1, "Historical and comparative frameworks," in An Introduction to Middle Eastern Law, cited supra n. 1. 46. Sarakhsi, al-Mabsut, xiii, 80, discussed in A. Udovitch, "Les echanges de 
march6 dans l'Islam medieval: Theorie du droit et savoir local," Studia Islamica, lxv, (1987), 5-30, at 17. 
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cording to which Islamic law subjects the legality of commercial 
transactions in the city to the practice of merchants and people.47 
Sometimes a contradiction arises over the clash between the ne- 
cessity of certainty in the contract, and usage. In one instance of such 
a clash, Sarakhsi explicitly says that the law ultimately chooses what 
will facilitate people's lives.48 In another example which shows how 
the law merchant relies on custom in Islam, the departing point is 
that if one is selling something that does not yet exist, it is obvious 
that the element of certainty in the contract may be undermined. In a 
long text, Sarakhsi explains that this may be the theory. In practice, 
when you ask someone to sew a cloth or to build a house for you, it is 
not possible to know exactly how it will turn out. Would that render 
the contract void? The answer in strict, classical Islamic law, should 
be yes. In fact, the opposite practice was and remains widely used.49 
To repeat a formula Sarakhsi ascribes to one of two masters of the 
Hanafi school, Abu Yusuf (d.798): "What matters in all things is the 
'urf .5o 
Kasani has equally striking formulas, one of which will be in- 
cluded, several centuries later, as one of the Ottoman Majalla's 
ninety-nine opening principles: in matters of sale, "what is known by 
custom is equal to what is agreed upon as a clause."51 
"This is what it cost me." With certainty, flexibility and pragmatism, 
a fourth element should perhaps be underlined in the Islamic law 
merchant. This appears in a text of Sarakhsi mentioned earlier as 
"this is what it cost me:"52 in other words, the 'extras' that come into 
the price of a commodity are important as they imply an opening up 
of the law merchant to a number of elements that are not strictly 
legal but are vital in the practice of trade. 
Here we have a few examples in studies on sixteenth and seven- 
teenth century Iraqi trade in Basra. Merchants had to allow for 
charges in what may be termed as protection costs, that is, "the price 
merchants had to pay in taxes, tolls, fees, and bribes, to ensure the 
flow of their commodities."53 This was part and parcel of the cost of 
47. Udovitch, "Echanges de march6," id., at 21. 
48. Sarakhsi, al-Mabsut, xiii, 115. ("taysiran 'alal-nas") 
49. Sarakhsi, al-Mabsut, xiii, 138. 
50. Sarakhsi, al-Mabsut, xiii, 142. 
51. "Al-ma'ruf bil-'urf kal-mashrut bil-shart," Kasani, v, 167; the exact wording 
was adopted as Art. 43 of the Ottoman Majalla ("Al-ma'ruf 'urfan kal-mashrut 
shartan"), see also Art. 40: "Al-haqiqa tutrak bi dalalat al-'ada, truth is left for cus- tom." Also on custom as 'ada (usage), Majalla Art. 36: "Al-'ada muhkama, usage is decisive"; Art. 41: "Innama tu'tad al-'ada idha ittaradat wa ghalabat, usage is fol- lowed if persistent." 
52. Supra, text accompanying n.46. 
53. Dina Rizk Khoury, "Merchants and trade in early modern Iraq," New Perspec- tives on Turkey 5-6 (1991), 53-86, at 54. 
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trade. The protection cost, it is acknowledged, "was just as important 
as a camel."54 
In these testimonies, the notion of protection is introduced as an 
element of what one could nowadays describe as "overhead." Protec- 
tion costs play a significant role in the determination of the ultimate 
price of the commodity. This is a common usage, and a practice one 
naturally finds in dealing with the Islamic world.55 This overhead 
will inevitably come into the price of not how much one buys the com- 
modity for, nor at what manufacturing cost it is produced, but how 
much it will ultimately cost in order for the trader to make a profit. 
As in the realistic opening lines of Sarakhsi's book of sales, the 
benefit of a sale contract should be appreciated in its wider perspec- 
tive: "God has made money the reason (sabab) for people benefiting 
from, and enjoying the world."56 
A CONTEMPORARY ECHO: THE ECONOMICS OF THE LAW MERCHANT 
Ten centuries after Dimashqi, Sarakhsi and Kasani, the relevance of 
trade as an economic 'given' of an Islamic theory of "economics" can 
be found again in the works of Muhammad Baqer al-Sadr (d. 1980). 
Sadr is important in the field of Islamic commerce for several 
reasons. First, his 800-page book on the Islamic economic system, 
Iqtisaduna ('our economic system'),57 and his views on the Interest- 
Free Bank58 are two landmarks in 20th century Muslim reflection on 
the subject. Secondly, the originality of the work results from the 
heavy use by Sadr of classical Islamic law. In an archetypal search 
for longue duree, one cannot rely on systematic series, which may or 
not be available for a relatively limited period of time. Sadr was 
aware of this constraint in his search for an Islamic theory of econom- 
ics. In contrast, we have seen how the legal tradition is rich and sus- 
tained, and Sadr's reliance on fiqh to expound the core principles of 
his system shows the way for trade patterns modelled on legal 
principles. 
Sadr does not question, as did Marxist socialism which was the 
main object of Iqtisaduna's criticism, the importance of free trade. 
For him, unimpeded commerce is a given, and the centrality of trade 
surfaces in the book through Sadr's use of the concept of "distribu- 
54. Id., quoting N. Steensgaard, Carracks, Caravans and Companies 111 (1973). 55. 'Protection' understood from a positive side is important in whatever business is being undertaken in Middle Eastern countries, and the concept of 'sponsorship' in Saudi Arabia is obviously the most eloquent example of how vital it is to secure finan- 
cially the attention and the participation of the local powerful people who would facili- tate this trade. 
56. Sarakhsi, al-Mabsut, xii, 108. 
57. See Iqtisaduna (Our economic system), (1959-61), passim. The book is dis- 
cussed in Chibli Mallat, The Renewal of Islamic Law (1993), chapter 4. 58. Al-bank al-la ribawi fil-Islam (the interest-free bank) (1969). 
2000] 97 
THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE LAW 
tion." Distribution informs the two economic "phases" in which the 
book is divided: distribution before production, and distribution after 
production. 
Generally, the "apparatus of distribution" is discussed by 
Muhammad Baqer as-Sadr by way of the two concepts which under- 
pin it, need and labour. "Two essential tools constitute the apparatus 
of distribution in Islam: labour, and need."59 In this perspective, 
property becomes "a secondary element of distribution,"60 and is al- 
ways limited by a set of moral values and social interests established 
by religion. The three elements forming the basis of the distributive 
apparatus of Islam are summarised by Sadr as follows: 
Labour is a primary tool of distribution from the stand- 
point of ownership. The person who works in nature reaps 
the fruit of his work and possesses it. 
Need is a primary tool of distribution as the expression 
of a human right which is essential in life. Islamic society 
recognises and supplies essential needs. 
Property is a secondary tool of distribution, by way of 
commercial activity which Islam permits within special con- 
ditions which do not conflict with the Islamic principles of 
social justice. . .61 
From there, Sadr follows up the role of distribution in the two phases 
just mentioned, distinguishing between "the general theory of distri- 
bution before production" and "distribution in the post-production 
phase." Although he acknowledges that the division is artificial, since 
"the two studies [of distribution before and after production] are in- 
tertwined," Sadr chooses a new angle to address "the sources of pro- 
duction," which he had identified in the pre-production phase as 
"land, raw materials, and the tools necessary for production." Legal 
rules of distribution after production, in contrast, are concerned with 
"productive wealth, which is the goods made by labour as exercised 
over nature, and results from a combination between these material 
sources of production."62 
The legal framework regulating distribution in the second 
phase-the productive process-includes the importance of reviving 
and exploiting the land in its ownership,63 the prohibition of riba,64 
the encouragement of commerce as productive activity and not as 
intermediation.65 
59. Iqtisaduna, 308: apparatus of distribution, jihaz at-tawzi'; labour, 'amal; 
need, haja. 
60. Iqtisaduna, 321. 
61. Iqtisaduna, 322. 
62. Iqtisaduna, 387-88, see also at 524. 
63. Iqtisaduna, 590. 
64. Iqtisaduna, 591-92. 
65. Iqtisaduna, 621-22. 
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It is clear that exchange in its material sense is one of 
the forms of production. The transportation of wealth from a 
place to another creates in many instances a new benefit and 
is considered an enhancement of the commodity's value for 
human need, whether the transportation is vertical - as in 
extractive industries, in which production conducts an oper- 
ation of transport of raw material from the depth of the 
earth to its surface - or horizontal, as in transporting prod- 
ucts to the areas close to consumers, and making them ready 
for customer use. Such transportation is a kind of enhance- 
ment to a better kind with regard to the needs of man.66 
Sadr carries on with the legal scheme attuning to commerce, by ad- 
ducing, as he does in the rest of the book, a number of legal texts 
drawn from various scholars belonging to all schools in the classical 
tradition.67 When this is done, the conclusion is the protection of com- 
merce so long as it "has a productive content."68 Intermediation is 
favoured when it is "a branch of production." From a famous letter of 
'Ali, the fourth Caliph and first Shi'i imam (d.661 CE), to Malek al- 
Ashtar, his governor of Egypt, Sadr derives the importance of "good" 
commerce: 
It is clear from this text that merchants as a group are 
brought into one with the people of industry,69 that is the 
manufacturers,70 and they were all portrayed as the provid- 
ers of benefits. The merchant creates a benefit in the same 
way as the manufacturer. ['Ali] followed on by explaining the 
benefits which the merchants create, and the operations that 
they accomplish, in securing wealth from far away places, 
from areas where people [i.e., buyers] do not naturally 
gather, and where they do not go.71 
So commerce was for Sadr an unquestionable premise for his 
new 'economic theory', even if the legal texts used in Iqtisaduna are 
not typically those relating to commerce. Sadr's main concern was 
over property of land, and of strategic resources like oil. In contradis- 
tinction to his indirect investigation of Islamic economics by means of 
fiqh, our purpose here is a more direct one, which looks into commer- 
cial law as directly expressed in the books, rather than for a more 
66. Iqtisaduna, 615. 
67. "Al-nusus al-madhhabiyya," the texts of the Islamic legal schools, Iqtisaduna, 
618-20, from Shi'i jurists like al-Saduq (d.381/991), al-Shahid al-Thani (d.966/1669), 
and al-Hurr al-'Amili (d.1104/1693); Hanafis, like Ibrahim al-Halabi (d.956/1549) and 
al-Marghinani d.593/1197); Hanbalis like Ibn Qudama (d.620/1223), as well as Malek (d. 179/195) and Shafi'i (d.204/820). 
68. Iqtisaduna, 622. 
69. dhawi al-sina'at. 
70. producers, muntijin. 
71. Iqtisaduna, 618. 
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abstract notion of economics. In the legal field proper, however, not 
much of a remarkable tradition has remained. 
THE BREAK: THE OTTOMAN COMMERCIAL CODE (1850) 
Any familiarity with commercial law in the contemporary Middle 
East shows the lexical and structural chasm between the classical 
system and the modern codes. Commercial codes are strictly mod- 
elled after the civil law tradition in most countries, or, as in Israel, 
Jordan and Pakistan, occasionally follow the common law tradition. 
The time-honoured lexicon of classical trade has fallen into disregard. 
Nor can the Islamic law merchant be readily transposed into the 
modern world of commerce, but the dimensions just outlined offer a 
useful background for the practitioner: distribution comes, as arche- 
typal concern, before production, trade constitutes the nerve of the 
Middle Eastern city, sale is the paragon contract, custom is crucial to 
appreciating the operation of exchange and profit in real life, and 
"real cost" of the transaction, including hidden costs of protection and 
intermediation, is the bottom line of any trade operation. 
None of this seems crucial in modern statutory and court law, as 
seen in the survey of recent commercial law decisions presented in 
the first part of the chapter. 
In many areas, the ignorance of the tradition is not surprising. 
Notwithstanding the possible emergence of commercial papers in the 
Middle East where the suftaja seems to have been a long-established 
model of a letter of credit or even a 'cheque',72 the complexities of 
commercial papers developed decisively only in the twentieth cen- 
tury, and it would have been very hard - though not theoretically 
impossible - to merge the sophisticated instruments of a rapidly 
changing commercial scene in the world with remnants of a pre-capi- 
talist medieval system. 
How did that break come about formally ? 
A clear separation between fiqh and qanun can be traced back to 
the Ottoman legislator's introduction, in the middle of the 19th cen- 
tury, of a commercial code which was a direct transposition from the 
French tradition. 
72. See for instance Goitein, supra n. 36, at i, 242. Also, Udovitch, "Merchants 
and amirs: government and trade in eleventh century Egypt," Asian and African Studies 22 (1988), 52-72, at 66: "Islamic commercial law and practice recognized nu- 
merous forms and instruments of credit. For the transfer of an obligation from one 
place to the other and for its speedy redemption into cash, none was more effective or 
more efficient than the suftaja." A papyrus dated ca 900 CE mentions the word in 
plural, Albert Dietrich, Arabische Briefe aud der Papyrussammlung der Hamburger Staats- und Universitats- Bibliothek 15 (1955): "wa qabilu minna al-safati"' (and they 
accepted our 'promisory notes'). Dietrich suggests also translating it as 'cheque', at 22. Joseph Schacht translates suftaja as 'bill of exchange' (An Introduction to Islamic 
Law 78 (1964)), and Udovitch, in an earlier work cited infra n. 136, as 'letter of credit' (at 80). 
[Vol. 48 100 
COMMERCIAL LAW IN THE MIDDLE EAST 
Unlike for the Majalla, where a real effort was introduced, both 
in terms of rules and in terms of legal categories, to produce a code 
inspired by the Islamic legal tradition, there was clearly no regard for 
the tradition by the Ottoman legislator. 
Nor did the Ottoman commercial code of 1850 pay attention to 
the local conditions long acknowledged by the shari'a. Plagiarism was 
so widespread that the Ottoman borrower did not realize that the dis- 
positions of the French system were totally inadequate to an Islamic 
society where the wife's property is by definition separate from her 
husband's in the absence of a regime of matrimonial property. This 
was noted by an early commentator: 
The fourth section of the [Ottoman Commercial] Code 
relating to the rights of women and the articles that compose 
it are completely useless, and have not the least practical 
application in case of the husband's insolvency. Indeed for 
Ottoman civil law, marriage is nothing else than the legiti- 
mate union of man and woman for the exclusive perpetua- 
tion of the human race, and excludes any idea of association 
that would seek mutual help for bearing the expenses of life 
and family, uniting goods as well as individuals, or improv- 
ing together, through the separate contribution of matrimo- 
nial goods, their lot and sharing it. This joint association 
between the spouses is neither arranged nor regulated, and 
this association does not actually exist.73 
Thus is underlined the inadequacy of the Ottoman code's extensive 
regulation (Arts. 264-270) of the matrimonial regime of joint prop- 
erty: "In fact as well as in law, there is always separation, never com- 
munity of goods between the spouses; the wife keeps the entire and 
exclusive administration and use of its movable and immovable prop- 
erty, which she disposes of entirely and freely, and which she can sell 
at any time without seeking authorisation from the husband, and in 
case he disagrees, from the civil tribunal."74 The French model was in 
this particular case alien and superfetatory. 
Blind replication is also true for commercial partnerships, the 
importance of which does not need to be underlined in modern capi- 
talist societies. 
Classical commercial law of Islam does not know those forms of 
partnership without which the present capitalist world cannot be un- 
derstood: the limited company. One is then immediately faced with a 
problem, which derives from the long-term structure which the Is- 
lamic law of contract has imposed, regarding the strict individuality 
of the commercial transaction. But for arguable exceptions of waqf 
73. Th6ophile Piat, Code de commerce ottoman explique (in Arabic and in French) 
809-10 (1876). 
74. Id., at 810. 
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(trusts), and bayt al-mal, (the public treasury),75 partnerships in Is- 
lamic law were never recognized as 'corporate entities' which would 
be separate from the partners undertaking the trade. There is no cor- 
porate person in classical Islamic law, partly a consequence of the 
care for certainty in that system. Islamic law, even with commercial 
ventures, deals primarily with the individual as bearer of commercial 
duties and rights, whose word and involvement are essential. The 
corporate entity, in contrast, is by definition more diffuse. Since the 
attempts began in the 1850s for commercial codes to be introduced in 
the Middle East, the field of company law has been torn between the 
necessity of a faceless legal dimension which is represented by the 
independent moral personality of a company, and the recognition of 
known and fully liable individuals in the effective running of the 
trade. 
Borrowing from the west occurred on a large scale across the 
area. Already the first commercial codification of law in the Middle 
East appears at loggerheads with any attempt to adopt Islamic rules. 
The Ottoman Commercial Code of 1850 is a replica of the French 
commercial code introduced by Napoleon. 
As in the case of matrimonial property, plagiarism was such that 
in the course of the first Middle Eastern commercial borrowing, the 
Ottoman legislator forgot that it was in the French civil code, and not 
in the commercial code, that the main regulations of commercial com- 
panies are to be found. Hence a skeletal chapter of 10 articles on the 
societe anonyme, which was rapidly becoming the most financially 
important vehicle in company law in France. 
In a chapter entitled "the third type [of companies, after the so- 
ciete en nom collectif and the societe en commandite]: societe 
anonyme," it is prescribed under Art. 20 that "the company (which 
does not have a name, al-ghayr musammat) and which we call 
'anonyme' does not exist under a social reason. It is not designated 
under any of the partners' names" and is necessarily "qualified by the 
designation of the object of the enterprise" (Art. 21). Piat explains 
that "the mere name of the company, or societe anonyme, is sufficient 
to make known the special object which it deals with; it must be con- 
fined to it."76 The reason for this, a Turkish commentator of the time 
75. There is a large literature on waqf, with recent work ranging far and wide in 
history and geography, e.g., from Randi Deguilhem and Jean-Paul Pascual in Syria in the pre-modern and modern period; to McChesney's monograph on the development of 
a shrine in central Asia over four centuries, to Michael Dumper on the current situa- 
tion of Muslim foundations in Jerusalem. The legal concept of bayt al-mal is elusive. It is discussed in Report on the Budget in Classical and Contemporary Law (1996), 
which is an unpublished consultancy (17 august 1996) by the author on the occasion 
of the dispute between the ruler of Qatar and his deposed father, then before the High Court in London. The classical text on budgetary 'rules' is by Ibn Mammati (d.1208), Kitab qawanin al-dawawin (Rules of the ministries) (1943) (ed. by A. 'Atiyya). 76. Piat, supra n. 73, at 60. 
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explained, is the necessary dissociation between the company on the 
one hand, and, on the other hand, "the shareholders and the manag- 
ers who are not accountable for the expenses and the losses of the 
company beyond the shares in capital which they paid up and for 
which they are liable."77 
Only two articles in the Ottoman Code deal with the manage- 
ment of the societe anonyme: "The societe anonyme is administered 
by time-bound agents who are revocable. They may be shareholders 
or not, and they may or not earn a wage." (Art. 22) Limitation of lia- 
bility is established in the next article: "The administrators are liable 
only for the execution of the mandate they have received; they do not 
incur, because of their management, any personal or joint liability for 
the company's engagements." (Art. 23) 
This is all one finds for the administration of the societe 
anonyme. Rules dealing with shares and shareholders are equally 
succinct. Article 24 defines the types of responsibility of the share- 
holders, who "are liable only to the extent of their interests in the 
company," and the Code deals then with capital and shares: "The cap- 
ital of the societe anonyme is divided in shares, and even in fractions 
of shares of equal value." (Art. 25) In principle, only bearer shares are 
admitted: "The share is established in the form of a bearer's entitle- 
ments (titre au porteur); in this case, cession operates by the transfer 
of title." (Art. 26) But the following article recognised, without nam- 
ing it, nominal titles: "The ownership of shares is established by their 
inscription on the books of the company. Cession operates by a decla- 
ration of transfer from the company, which is written in the margin 
of the title, and which will be registered in the company's books." 
(Art. 27) Registration of the ownership of shares offered evidence 
which allowed minimal control for the issuance and transfer of 
shares, even if, as noted then, the Ottoman Code poorly adapted the 
French model which lists the formalities required for transfer: decla- 
ration written in the books, and the signature of the transferor or his 
representative.78 
These short articles on the most important commercial company 
were supplemented by the necessity to seek an imperial decree 
authorising the company's establishment (Art. 28) and the registra- 
tion of the articles of association "before the Tribunal of commerce" 
(Art. 31). In comparison with the two other types of company men- 
tioned in the Code, the societe anonyme looks like the least favoured 
object of legislative care. This brevity is compounded by the lean at- 
tention to companies overall, whilst other commercial matters were 
77. Sharh qanun at-tijara, lihadrat 'utufatlu wahan afandi (Wahan Effendi, com- 
mentary on the commercial code), Arabic translation by Nuqula Naqqash, Beirut 
1297/1880, in Ibrahim Sader (ed.), Majmu'at al-qawanin al-'adliyya (collection of civil 
laws), Beirut n.d., 34. 
78. Piat, supra n. 73, at 74. 
2000] 103 
THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE LAW 
regulated thoroughly, such as the bill of exchange (Title 6, Arts. 70 to 
146) and bankruptcy (the whole of Book 2, Arts. 147-288 for insol- 
vency, Arts. 288-315 on bankruptcy). The legislator realized soon af- 
terwards that such an important commercial institution required a 
more elaborate treatment, which was introduced in a separate law a 
decade later. 
With all its shortcomings, the first Commercial Code in the area 
offers a model one finds across the Middle East. All the codes are at- 
tentive to the detailed treatment of such areas as bankruptcy, com- 
mercial papers, the qualifications of the profession of trader, in a 
relatively straightforward translation of the western models. This 
has been achieved through the wholesale introduction of comprehen- 
sive codes, or through separate laws on the commercial business, off- 
shore companies, commercial procedure, juxtaposed over the years in 
the field. To this legislation one must add international and regional 
conventions in special concerns such as maritime and air law, or com- 
mercial arbitration. 
A list of commercial codes and their contents would be fastidious. 
These texts are more or less sophisticated. They might have been in- 
troduced wholesale, from the earliest, the Ottoman Code of 1850, to 
the most recent such Code, the Commercial Transactions Law of the 
United Arab Emirates (December 1993).79 Specific commercial stat- 
utes may have also been introduced gradually. This was the case in 
Saudi Arabia from the 1930s onwards.80 
Thus the gist of commercial law since the first Ottoman codification. 
It is, however, not possible to read these statutes as complete and 
absolute replica of western counterparts, and the local practitioner 
will remain attentive to homegrown specificities, regardless of whole- 
sale borrowing from the west. Indeed, some commercial statutes are 
particularly important for their specific Middle Eastern flavor, even if 
they are not necessarily inspired by the shari'a. 
One area where the Middle East may have developed an institu- 
tion which is typical, whilst not rooted in an older tradition, is agency 
law. Here, specific statutes rule the field, which have no Islamic pedi- 
gree. While foreign antecedents can be found, their Middle East ap- 
plication was so autonomous that the statutes, with the help of 
courts, developed a life of their own. 
79. See Price, supra n. 22. 
80. The most important Saudi code is that known as Nazam al-mahkama al- 
tijariyya, passed more than sixty years ago, in 1350 AH. It establishes rules regulat- 
ing the profession of merchants (Arts. 1-10), including agents, commissioners (Arts. 
18-41), companies (Arts. 11-17), commercial papers (Arts. 42-102); bankruptcy Arts. 
103-149); maritime commerce (full section 2, Arts. 150-430); the regulation of com- 
mercial proceedings, as well as various related taxes and fees (sections 3 and 4, re- 
spectively Arts. 432-587 and 588-633). 
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Agency is in this regard a wide concept, which covers most con- 
tracts between foreign manufacturers and local importers. Consider- 
ing that, outside the oil industry, trade is the nerve of economic 
activity in the region, the importance of commercial agency cannot be 
underestimated. 
We shall examine now some of the most characteristic legal 
traits in those countries where free trade is still the rule. Other coun- 
tries, which have espoused a more rigid "socialist" framework, like 
Libya, Egypt, Syria and Iraq, may share some of the commercial 
agency special rules which are under discussion, but the overall eco- 
nomic system remains centered on the state. While trade in other 
countries of the Gulf, the Levant and North Africa are not free from 
burdensome constraints, the principle is based on an overall "free" 
capitalist system. There, the rules on commercial agency go to the 
heart of commercial law in the private sector. 
The Middle East is in this respect full of surprises. 
COMMERCIAL AGENCY 
A major element of surprise for the foreign manufacturer tends 
to arise upon a dispute with a commercial agent who might have 
faithfully represented him over a period of years in a "sole agency" 
contract which, for one reason or the other, the foreign principal 
would like to discontinue. For the Japanese manufacturer, the com- 
mon law practitioner, or the European trader who is used to the pro- 
tection of Articles 85 and 86 regulating competition in the Treaty of 
Rome, the snare of the Middle Eastern agency/distributorship is the 
more surprising in view of the compensation owed by the foreign 
principal to the agent/distributor: "In common law jurisdictions the 
principle of autonomy of contract applies with particular vigour to 
commercial agency. There is no special statutory regime governing 
commercial agents, no requirement for registration, no principle of 
compensation to the agent following lawful termination of the agency 
agreement."81 In contrast, the typical statutory legislation will run in 
the Middle East as follows: 
No person shall engage in the business of commercial 
agencies in the state unless his name has been entered in 
the Register of Commercial Agents prepared for this purpose 
in the Ministry. A Commercial Agency which is not recorded 
in this Register shall not be recognised, nor shall any claim 
be heard with regard thereto. (Art. 3) 
81. Goode, "Preface," in Samir Saleh, Commercial agency and distributorship in the Arab Middle East xix (1995). See generally on the subject my "Comparative mod- 
els of freedom of trade: the hurdle of Lebanese sole agency," in W. Shahin & K. Shehadi (eds.), Pathways to integration: Lebanon and the Euro-mediterranean part- 
nership 209-27 (1997). 
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An agent shall be entitled to commission on transactions 
which the principal concludes himself or through another 
person in the agent's territory, even if such transactions are 
not concluded as a result of the efforts of the agent. (Art. 7) 
A principal shall not terminate the agency agreement in 
the absence of any reason to justify such action. An agency 
may not be re-registered in the Register of Commercial 
Agents in the name of another agent, even if the previous 
agency is limited to a fixed term. (Art. 8) 
If an agency is withdrawn at an inopportune time for 
any reason not attributable to the agent, the principal may 
be required to provide compensation for any losses and loss 
of anticipated profits. In the absence of proof that the agent 
committed a wrong justifying non-renewal, the principal's 
refusal to renew an agent's contract after the expiry of it origi- 
nal term shall constitute an abusive exercise of rights entail- 
ing appropriate compensation... (Art. 9) 
Thus the Federal Law No.18 of 1981 regulating commercial agencies 
in the United Arab Emirates.82 Such legislation is typical of the Arab 
Middle East, where a principal is forced to retain an agent - in the 
absence of a major fault - even if the agency agreement comes to an 
end. Breach of the agreement or failure to renew it will invariably 
lead the agent to claim compensation, and both the courts and the 
administrative agencies will play a large role in ensuring that the 
system is centralised and so tightly protected that any new agent 
would be either barred or deterred from carrying on the agency until 
full compensation is paid to the previous agent. 
The discontinuation of the relationship, leading as a matter of 
principle to compensation for the agent regardless of the terms or 
length of the contract at the origins of this relationship, constitutes a 
first element of surprise for the foreign observer. 
At the legislative origin of such exorbitant constraints on the 
principal, who tends to be invariably a foreign manufacturer or sup- 
plier, lies Lebanese Decree-Law No. 34, issued on 5 August 1967 
(amended 1975).83 Decree-Law 34 is the first such law to be passed in 
the Arab Middle East and represents the prototype for a plethora of 
agency/distributorship legislative regulations in the UAE, the Gulf 
and elsewhere, all featuring the same "exorbitant" character as the 
original: 
A commercial representation contract shall be deemed 
to be made for the mutual benefit of the contracting parties. 
Therefore, in the event of its termination by the principal 
82. As amended by Federal Law No.14 of 1988. Text reproduced in Saleh, supra n. 
81, at 11-37. Emphasis added. 
83. Id., at 3-41. 
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without any fault on the part of the agent or without any 
other lawful cause, the agent shall, notwithstanding any 
agreement to the contrary, be entitled to claim compensation 
equivalent to any damage he may have sustained or to any 
profits he may have lost. (Art. 4 ?2) 
In addition, 
The commercial representative shall also be entitled, 
even in the event of termination of the contract by the expiry 
of its term and notwithstanding any agreement to the con- 
trary, to claim compensation to be determined by the court, 
when the efforts of the commercial representative have led 
to manifest success in the promotion of the trade mark of his 
principal or have resulted in an increase in the number of 
his customers and the refusal of the principal to renew the 
agency agreement has prevented the representative from 
reaping the profits of his success. (Art. 4 ?1) 
Thus the first "excessive" dimension: compensation for termination of 
agency as a matter of principle, regardless of its length or terms. 
A corollary "exorbitant" dimension arises in relation to the strin- 
gent application of the laws on agency/import by the judicial and ad- 
ministrative set-up within the country. These regulations one 
encounters with few variations across the Arab Middle East, and vest 
in the judicial and administrative apparatus which enforces the pro- 
tection of the agent/distributor in an exclusive contract. 
The judicial apparatus tends to be involved in the award of com- 
pensation, which is often put, in order to take into account "lost prof- 
its," a compensation of two, three, and up to five times the amount of 
net profits of the annual average rate in the last years of the 
agency.84 
The administrative apparatus ensures that, once the agency is 
breached or not renewed, a subsequent agent would be held jointly 
liable with the foreign principal for the amount of compensation de- 
creed by the court. In some Gulf countries, the ministry of trade or a 
specialised committee will refuse the registration of a new agent so 
long as the termination of the previous agency has not been fully 
settled.85 
84. E.g., for Lebanon, various decisions reported in E. Abu 'Id, Al-tamthil al-tijari (commercial agency), 2 vols. (1991). An early application appears in a Court of Cassa- 
tion decision of 15 march 1973, upholding the plea of the petitioner that "compensa- tion is equivalent to lost profit for three years at least and five years at the most, 
calculated on the average profit of the three last years," Hatem (Lebanese law re- 
porter), 142, 1973, 22, at 23. See also generally M. Mahmassani, La representation 
commerciale en droit positif libanais 408-09 (1972). 
85. Centralization is crucial to the system: a decision of the Bahrain Court of Cas- 
sation rejected any compensation because the registration of the agency as required 
by Law 23 of 1975 relating to commercial agencies and their organization had not 
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In practice, this allows the impounding of goods and the involv- 
ing of any new agent/importer as a joint debtor in solidum with the 
foreign principal/exporter by the agent/trader whose contract is ter- 
minated or not renewed. The necessity of registering the agency, and 
the explicit or implicit assimilation of distributorship and agency, are 
also common features in the area. 
Thus arises the second element of dismay: the easy assimilation 
in the Middle East of the "commercial agent" and the importer/dis- 
tributor/ trader: "A trader who sells on his own behalf what he 
purchases in accordance with a contract which grants him the capac- 
ity of representative or exclusive distributor, shall be deemed to be 
the same as a commercial representative."86 
A distributor will therefore be assimilated in the region to a com- 
mercial agent, and will benefit from the exclusive clause even if he 
buys and sells on his own behalf.87 Agent and distributor tend to be 
amalgamated by Arab statutes, whereas they tend to be radically dis- 
tinguished for purpose of competition in Europe (Arts. 85ss of the 
Treaty of Rome) and the United States (the Anti-trust laws). This 
appears to be the crux of the difference between the legal regime of 
distribution in the Middle East and its western counterparts, and the 
one which seems to be conducive to foreign manufacturers shouting 
blue murder every time an Arab importer claims compensation for 
the termination of an agreement. 
The vast impact on commerce of these regulations explains why, 
next to corporate work, representation and distributorship offer the 
commercial practitioner in the Arab Middle East the major point of 
anchor of daily activity. In a region where commerce and banking 
have so far constituted the nerve of wealth, Lebanese Decree-Law 34 
and its 1975 Amendment, as well as its Arab followers, are a central 
staple of commercial litigation.88 
The special philosophy behind commercial agency Middle-East 
style is illustrated in an expressive decision of the Supreme Federal 
Court in the United Arab Emirates, which went to the extent of offer- 
ing constitutional protection to the laws of agency.89 
been effected. Dawlat al-Bahrain, Mahkamat al-tamyiz, 10 november 1991, MAFQ 
14, 1993, 263-267 at 266-67. 
86. Lebanon, Decree-law 34, 1967, amended 1975, Art. 1?2. 
87. In the UAE legislation noted above, there is no such explicit assimilation, but the necessity to register 'the agency' leads in practice to the assimilation of agent and 
importing trader. See generally Saleh, supra n. 81, at, Chs. 1 and 11; and my book 
review in Yearbook of Islamic and Middle Eastern Law, ii, 635-37 (1995). 
88. See for a Kuwaiti illustration within a comparative setting, the extensive 
analysis of Ahmad 'Abd al-Rahman al-Milhim, "Mada taqyid 'aqd al-qusr lil- 
munafasa al-ra'siyya (Restrictions on exclusive contracts by vertical competition 
rules)," Majallat al-huquq (Kuwait), 20, 1996, 13-108. 
89. UAE, Federal Supreme Court (constitutional chamber), 14 april 1993, MAFQ 
16, october 1994, 109. 
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The facts of the case are typical, and concern an exclusive agent 
selling computers in the country, who had the goods of a parallel im- 
porter impounded. A constitutional plea was brought to the Federal 
Court by the parallel importer, who argued against the constitution- 
ality of Laws 1981 and 1988 on the basis that the shari'a, as the 
supreme law of the land, did not accept such abuse of the market, and 
that these laws were therefore conducive to hoarding. 
The Court demurred, by explaining that if indeed hoarding was 
illegal under Islamic law,90 
it appears from reading and analysing the text of the afore- 
mentioned law that it leads in no way to the prevention of 
commercial deals which are the object of commercial agency 
or the increase in price. These texts only regulated the rela- 
tionship resulting from the contract of commercial agency 
between the commercial agent and between the manufac- 
turer or supplier inside or outside the country, or the ex- 
porter and the exclusive distributor adopted by the producer. 
The legislator considers this contract to arise for the benefit 
of both contracting parties. The legislator did not prohibit its 
termination or its renewal as the appellant alleges, but al- 
lowed, under Art. 8 of the law, the termination of the agency 
contract by the principal and its non-renewal if there were 
reasons to do so. The legislator did prohibit the importation 
of merchandise or produces or manufactured items or other 
goods that are subject to an official registration with the gov- 
ernment with a view to circumvent the agent. It also 
authorised the principal to use one sole agent in the state 
considered as one unit or in each Emirate or in a number of 
Emirates, and it required the commercial agents to provide 
spare parts, items and appendages which are necessary and 
sufficient for maintenance of the imported goods. This helps 
the flow of merchandise and facilitates commercial loans, 
bringing them within everyone's reach in various areas of 
great proximity. It leads to preventing the increase in 
price.91 
The Court went on to explain that this competitive reality "is not af- 
fected by the last section of Art. 5 of the Law on the exclusivity of the 
distribution of merchandise and services which are the object of the 
agency to the commercial agent within his territory, since the object 
of the agent is always to sell these products and to trade them in 
order to get his commission. This encourages him to lower its price as 
much as possible, and to accept a small profit in order to reach this 
90. Quoting the hadith, "al-jalib marzuq wal-muhtakir mal'un, the provider will be rewarded and the monopolist chastised," at 112. 
91. At 110-11. 
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aim and stand on a par with other companies which produce goods 
with the same object and put them on offer in a competitive set-up 
with low prices. In addition, a failure in distribution or an attempt to 
hoard these goods to increase their price could be a reason that his 
principal might use to terminate the agency or to refuse its 
renewal."92 
In conclusion, the Court said, "the rules of this law do not en- 
courage the hoarding which is prohibited by the shar' and does not 
lead to it. There is nothing in it which violates the rules of Islamic 
law, and consequently constitutional provisions. The appeal lacks 
base and should be rejected."93 
One can see in the Court's explanation a sophisticated battery of 
arguments in support of the agency/import laws of the UAE, some of 
which textual (the Prophet's sayings, hadith), some of which eco- 
nomic (prevention of monopoly, encouragement of interbrand compe- 
tition), some legal (mutually beneficial contracts). All in all, the 
constraining statutes are upheld in the name of a hazy, but real, com- 
mercial public order. 
These explanations can be supplemented by the remarks of Leb- 
anese commercial judges in an early case: for the Beirut commercial 
court, only an exclusive distributorship would be entitled to the pro- 
tection of Decree-Law 34, and the seller could come to an agreement 
with others at any time in the absence of the exclusivity clause.94 
"Irrespective and notwithstanding all the aforementioned," the 
Court held, "it is impossible, either from the point of view of social 
justice, or from an economic point of view, and in view of Lebanon's 
relations with the outside world, to expand the interpretation of Arti- 
cle 1 section 2 of Decree-Law 34, which does constitute a statutory 
exception undermining general principles and contradicting all es- 
tablished known legal rules and all usual practice in commerce, so 
that it is necessary to interpret the decision in a limited way, which 
restricts its application to commercial representatives who possess 
the quality of exclusive representatives or distributors, and who are 
harmed in absolute from the rescission of the contract binding them 
to their principal with regard to distributing a specific type of 
merchandise."95 
Thus a further rationale, under which the statute must be nar- 
rowly interpreted because both agent and principal are limited to 
"specific types of merchandise," and because the distributor will not 
benefit from the protection of the law so long as his contract is not 
92. Id. 
93. At 111. 
94. Mahkamat bidayat beirut al-tijariyya (commercial court of Beirut, first in- 
stance), 23 december 1969, reported in Abu 'Id, Al-tamthil al-tijari, i, 55. 
95. Id., at 60. 
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explicitly "exclusive." Once it is so labelled, it is surmised, there is no 
reason why the supplier should not be held to the contract he wilfully 
signed. 
The laws on commercial agency are well established in most open 
markets in the region, even if, under the new conventions which pow- 
erful economic actors like the European Union are negotiating, the 
excessive protection of exclusive agents-distributors is targeted in the 
name of free competition and consumer protection. The return to 
"freedom of trade," which is translated in this case as the illegality of 
exclusive agencies, has been put forward in countries like Jordan, Tu- 
nisia and Lebanon by treaties passed or to be passed with the Euro- 
pean Union. The rationale behind those conditions, from the EU 
drafters' perspective, is that consumers are the main victims of such 
segmented and exclusive arrangements.96 
In the overall philosophy of commercial law, laws on commercial 
agency have a strange and inconclusive pedigree. 
From the perspective of the shari'a, principled opposition to the 
restrictions appears in the plaintiffs arguments in the UAE case: 
agency contracts are freely revocable under classical law, and forcing 
the principal to compensate an agent upon revocation of agency is 
beyond the contemplation of the straightforward doctrine as can be 
found in the fiqh books. The principle is that an agency is revocable at 
any time, and that no compensation is owed: "agency is a non-binding 
contract, . . . and a separate judgment cannot be entered there- 
upon. . . The principal may terminate the agency whenever he 
wishes, on condition of informing the agent."97 
Agency is, with regard to the shari'a, close to its equivalent 
under the Common Law. The Arab rules on commercial agency ap- 
pear, in contrast, as typical illustrations of the prohibited practice of 
"restraint of trade." Regulation and compensation as discussed would 
not pass muster in a Common Law court, although a more nuanced 
conclusion may be warranted as soon as the agency becomes more 
specifically regulated. This would be the case in the increasingly com- 
plex variations taken by the new "distribution networks," which in- 
clude franchises and what English courts call "solus agreements."98 
Whilst not rooted in the shari'a, Middle East agency law might 
have another historical pedigree, which is French. The Lebanese stat- 
96. For details on the EU treaties and practice and their implication for the Mid- dle East, see "Comparative models," 223-27. 
97. "Al-wikala min al-'uqud ghayr al-lazima. . . wa la yasuhh al-hukmu biha 
maqsudan. . .fakan lil-muwakkil al-'azl mata sha'a bi-shart 'ilm al-wakil." Ibn 
Nujaym (d.970/1563), Al-bahr al-ra'eq fi sharh kanz al-daqa'iq, with the supercom- 
mentary of Ibn 'Abidin (d.1252/1836), 8 vols., Cairo 1311 AH, vii, 204. 
98. See Esso Petroleum Co. Ltd. v. Harper's Garage Stourport Ltd., 1968 [A.C.] 
269, per Lord Wilberforce for the difficult distinctions made by the Lords. Also G.H. 
Treitel, The Law of Contract (1991 ed.), 418ss. 
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ute of 1967 (modified and reinforced in 1975), which is the model for 
most Gulf legislation, owes much of its formulation to a French stat- 
ute passed in 1958.99 Unlike that French precedent, however, which 
remained limited in scope to a narrow category of commercial agents 
in France, the expansive concept of exclusive agency is a homegrown 
Middle Eastern product, which has adapted the logic of importation 
for the benefit of powerful merchants in the countries concerned. One 
can read many interpretations in the dominance of these statutes 
from their birth in the 1960s to date: they may be the local adapta- 
tion of French law, which was reinforced by a pattern of trade based 
on imports of manufactured European or Japanese goods. They may 
be, if projected further in the past, the commercial distribution 
equivalent of foreign concessions on trade, especially concessions on 
oil; or even concessions on large projects like the digging and operat- 
ing of the Suez Canal. If so, there is an example here of the transfor- 
mation of previous colonial patterns of dominance by the local elite 
for its own benefit. It may also be that the larger merchants have 
forced these statutes to protect themselves from the diktat of foreign 
agents, or from interference by local competitors: "[I]t would be a 
dangerous thing if one citizen started corrupting the relationship of 
other citizens with foreign companies and worked for the termination 
of their agreements."'00 It may be, more prosaically, that big 
merchants are defending their turf against local competition by 
smaller merchants, or indeed dividing markets up. 
Whatever the explanation, commercial agency in the Middle 
East is a typically local phenomenon, which dominates the patterns 
of trade in the region. As a specific regional manifestation, it may 
simply obey the universal rule that lex mercatoria is primarily the 
law of merchants, and those merchants will not be constrained in 
their choice of law by other interests than the ones that suit them. 
"Beware" is the practical advice to any foreign manufacturer who 
seeks distribution of its products in the region. Compensation for ap- 
pointing a new agent without having settled with the previous one 
can be costly.101 
99. The origins of the Lebanese law lay in French Decree 58, passed on 23 decem- ber 1958, to protect the category of commercial agents. The French law is discussed in J. H6mard, "Les agents commerciaux," Revue Trimestrielle de Droit Commercial 573- 
624 (1959). The law was amended significantly by European directives. For further 
references, see Mallat, "Comparative models," 217-20. 
100. As per the decision by the Saudi Board of Grievances in 1995 (no precise date), 
reported in Middle East Commercial Law Review (hereinafter MECLR ) 1, 1995, 23, 
with a comment by N. Saleh. 
101. In a 1996 case from Saudi Arabia, a German principal with an agency estab- lished in 1985 and terminated less than a decade later had to pay about 2 million USD in compensation to the agent, MECLR, 3, 1996, A-42. This was calculated in 
commission fees over a period of two and half years. In Lebanon, the courts award 
typically two to three years, perhaps even up to five in long-established, of net annual 
profits of the agent. See n. 84 supra. 
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COMPANY LAW 
Commercial agency rules may offer a specificity that is typical of 
trade networks and practice as developed in the modern Middle East. 
A similar argument, but one which may have a deeper legal pedigree, 
can now be pursued in the area of company law. 
Having noted the absence of a developed concept of 'company/ 
corporation/societe' in the Ottoman Commercial Code of 1850, an 
easy explanation could be put forward. Why should one be surprised, 
that argument goes, not to find elaborate 'limited liability companies', 
especially in the form of 'public corporations' or 'societes anonymes', 
when such corporations were themselves in their infancy in the west- 
ern legal world of the 19th century? There is no reason to suppose 
that the Ottoman Empire, or Egypt, would resist the adoption of the 
limited liability companies because of an absence of such legal enti- 
ties in the Islamic law tradition. It would be merely sufficient, the 
argument continues, to note that the early codes are contemporane- 
ous with a legal system which, in the west, is much less sophisticated 
than at present.102 
There may be more to the matter than the appropriate historical 
dating of the emergence of codes, and the argument about resisting 
the limited liability of shareholders should be examined more closely 
in the context of an absent tradition of 'corporate personality' and of 
'limited liability' in a Middle Eastern context. 
As aptly expressed in a recent judgment in the English commer- 
cial court, Middle Eastern companies are often the vehicles of individ- 
ual entrepreneurship: "The plaintiffs are a company registered in 
Nassau and the defendants are a company registered in London, but 
the real protagonists in the dispute are individuals. . . The evidence 
that I have heard suggests to me that the two companies are no more 
than convenient corporate vehicles for the business activities of their 
principal shareholders.'103 
The sore point relative to company law and the lack of a separate 
corporate personality can be seen in operation in three major fields: 
limited liability, capital markets, and Islamic, as opposed to western- 
style, banking. 
102. A good work on companies in the Arab world can be found in Gian Maria 
Piccinelli, La societd di persone nei paesi arabi (1990). Although focused on partner- 
ships, it offers a comprehensive guide to relevant company codes and literature. See 
charts at 247-51, and index of codes, 267-78. For the standard comparative work on 
company law in the west, Alfred Conard, Corporations (1st ed. 1976), rpt. 1991. 
103. Justice Phillips in Lemenda Trading Co. Ltd. v. African Middle East Petro- leum Co. Ltd., Queen's Bench Division, [1988] 1 All E.R. 413. 
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LIMITED LIABILITY 
All Middle Eastern countries have adopted equivalents to the French 
system of societe a responsabilite limitee and of societe anonyme, 
which make a strict separation between the assets of a company and 
the individual assets of shareholders and directors. 
One will find several decisions in which the limitation of liability 
is firmly entrenched. The standard principles can be found as early as 
the Ottoman Code of Commerce.104 They are repeated in the first for- 
mulation of the Saudi commercial law, which defines the 'inan com- 
pany105 as "a company between two or more persons, with a specific 
capital in which each of the partners has a limited share, and in 
which the partner does not suffer a prejudice or a loss beyond his 
share in the capital.'106 The principles of limited liability are repeat- 
edly elsewhere in the codes, and a recent case from Kuwait sums 
them up: 
The principle in the limited liability company [the 
French-style SARL, societe a responsabilite limitee] is the li- 
ability of each shareholder to the extent of his share. . . 
[This] liability is limited to the extent of his shares in the 
capital of the company, which is the main characteristic of 
this company, and from which it derives its appellation [as 
'limitee'] 107 
Yet both law and the business world have not fully digested the sepa- 
ration, and some courts are reluctant to stop at the company's assets 
in case of unfulfilled debt. 
This phenomenon is difficult to document in the absence of sys- 
tematic law reporting, particularly in the Gulf states where the size 
and importance of the companies in the wake of the oil boom is evi- 
dent. Legal practice, as far as can be ascertained from lawyers and 
businessmen, confirms the difficulty, in countries where the persona 
of the directors and major shareholders of companies is paramount, 
in limiting liability to the capital and assets of the company, without 
touching upon the personal property of the decisive actors in such 
business ventures. 
The example of the BCCI, whose major shareholder in the person 
of the ruler of Abu Dhabi was called upon to foot the bill beyond the 
bank's assets and who obliged the bank's creditors beyond what the 
104. Art. 24, quoted supra, in the section on the Ottoman commercial code. 
105. - "one of the branches of which is constituted by the limited liability com- 
pany"- Nizam al-Mahkama al-tijariyya, Art. 14. The limited liability company men- tioned here is the French soci6t6 anonyme, sharikat musahama in the original Arabic. 
106. Art. 13. 
107. Dawlat al-Kuwait, Da'irat al-tamyiz fi mahkamat al-isti'naf al-'ulya (high 
court of appeal), 2 may 1984, MAFQ 9, 1989, 336-338, at 337. 
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law of limited liability should have exacted, is a prime example of this 
intuitu personae of company practice in the Middle East.108 
While the problem seems to have arisen in similar terms from 
Saudi Arabia to Morocco,'09 three fully reported decisions from the 
United Arab Emirates and Bahrain illustrate the difficulty for courts 
to accept limitation on liability. Although the rulings do not alto- 
gether dismiss the principle of limited liability, the dilemma facing 
the judges is evident in the argumentation. Thus in Bahrain:110 
Even if the established principle is, in the limited liabil- 
ity company (SARL), limitation to the extent of [the share- 
holders'] shares in the company and the impossibility for the 
company's creditors to ask them [for the company's debts] or 
execute [the debt] against their property; nevertheless, if the 
direction of the company is entrusted with one of the share- 
holders, on his own or with others, then he is subject to the 
rule of Art. 235 of the Law on Commercial Companies, which 
establishes the joint liability of directors towards the com- 
pany, the shareholders and third parties for contravening 
the legal rules or the company statutes or committing a fault 
in the management in accordance to the rules of the joint- 
stock [societe anonyme] companies. The creditors of the com- 
pany, as third parties, can therefore attach the directors' pri- 
vate monies for damage resulting from their wrongful 
management."l 
Allowing creditors to go after the private assets of the directors/ 
shareholders was made possible here by a swift amalgamation of 
legal rules by the Bahraini Court of Cassation. It is also found appli- 
cable in the case of bankruptcy. "This personal liability remains," the 
Court continued, 
108. See the remarks of Rashid Safa, "Perspectives on bank failures in the Middle 
East" in H. Lewis Ruttley & C. Mallat (eds.), Commercial Law in the Middle East 155- 
65 at 160 (1995): "A striking feature of the BCCI failure is the aggressiveness with 
which the banking regulatory agencies in the major countries in which BCCI was 
operating had been soliciting contributions by the majority shareholders of BCCI, par- 
ticularly from the Abu Dhabi Investment Agency. The contributions were to offset the 
losses incurred by the bank, which amounted to a staggering $11 billion by the time 
BCCI closed down. These agencies presented a strong moral, though not legal, case by 
capitalising on the public outcry, the widespread extent of the fraud committed by the 
managers of the bank, and the unprecedented amount of BCCI's losses. This 'moral' 
case forced the Sheikhdom of Abu Dhabi to make substantial payments to compensate 
depositors." (emphasis added). On BCCI generally, Ibrahim Warde, BCCI: Perspec- tives from North and South (1991). 
109. A similar dilemma in Morocco was presented in a communication of Abdellatif 
Mechbal, "Le role unificateur de la cour de cassation marocaine en matiere commer- 
ciale" (read in Arabic at a conference on "Les cours judiciaires supremes dans le 
monde arabe"), Beirut, 15 may 1999. 
110. Dawlat al-Bahrain, Mahkamat al-tamyiz (court of cassation), 8 march 1992, 
MAFQ 16, 1994, 307-310. 
111. At 308. Emphasis added. 
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even after the dissolution of the company and its liquidation, 
so long as the directors remain in management and are con- 
sidered liquidators before the appointment of an [official] liq- 
uidator under the terms of Art. 258 of the Law. This is the 
case regardless whether the behaviour of the directors lead- 
ing to compensation is considered a crime under the terms of 
the Criminal Code or the Law on Commercial Companies.1l2 
To further assert the possibility to go after the personal property of 
the directors, possibly because the creditors were unable to execute a 
judgment in their favour, ten years earlier, "due to the company's 
lack of a legal presence in Bahrain at the time of enforcement,"113 the 
Court did not stop at one director. It made all directors (typically also 
the main shareholders) jointly liable on their personal wealth in the 
process: "If more than one director is responsible for the wrong, they 
were all liable jointly."114 
Another recent decision, from the UAE, faced a similar dilemma 
between limited liability and personal assets. Notwithstanding the 
results in the case, which is not very clear, the language used by the 
judges runs against the most basic principles of the restriction of 
shareholder responsibility to the limited extent of their 
investment.115 
The case is a complex one procedurally, and dovetails with a pre- 
vious case. In the earlier decision, the court of first instance had de- 
cided a sum of money, together with interest, for the plaintiff, a bank 
which had advanced funds to the company in which the defendant 
and others were shareholders. On appeal, the defendant alleged that 
he was responsible "only to the extent of his shares in the profits of 
the company, which are 27.5%."116 
It is not clear, in the decision of the court, what the ultimate re- 
sult was. The ruling was that the owner of the 27.5% of shares should 
pay that rate of the company's debt from his own private assets. So 
the court accepted the appeal in part, concluding that the decision in 
first instance be "varied, by annulling the judgment in its ruling 
about debt solidarity between the appellant, the first defendant com- 
pany, and the rest of the shareholders, and about interest, and the 
rejection of the remainder of the pleas in appeal. The appellant must 
pay the costs for the appeal."117 
112. Id., at 310. 
113. li-'adam wujud kiyan laha fil-Bahrain waqt al-tanfidh, at 309. 
114. Id., at 310. Wrongful and fraudulent management by directors, leading onto joint civil liability in solidum for all, can also be found in legislation outside the Mid- dle East. But the wide reach of the above decisions should be noted. 
115. Al-imarat al-'arabiyya al-muttahida (UAE), Mahkamat isti'naf Abu Dhabi (Abu Dhabi court of appeal), 30 may 1984, MAFQ 5, 1987, 305-313. 
116. At 308. 
117. At 313. 
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More importantly, the court's reasoning exposes the dilemma 
faced by the interface of classical Islamic law rules and modern com- 
pany liability: 
It is usual under Islamic law (shar') that in case there is no 
clause of solidarity in the statutes of the company, and if the 
company is indebted with money related to its objects and 
the company's assets are not sufficient to pay back the debt, 
the shareholders (partners, shuraka') are liable in their own 
assets for payment of the debt to the extent of the share of 
each in the losses of the company (Art. 671 of the project of 
civil transactions). The result is the liability of the company 
for its debts on all its assets, in addition to the responsibility 
of the shareholders/partners who are not bound in solidum, 
to the extent of the share of each one of them in the com- 
pany's capital.118 
One can see in this text the difficulty in conciliating the two princi- 
ples of unlimited and limited liability of partners/shareholders. 
More generally, these cases illustrate the competition between 
the two laws: the positive limited liability law, and the classical law 
in which persons are responsible on their personal assets. On the one 
hand, "the first thing which needs to be taken into account is the 
emergence of a corporate personality of the company and assets 
which are independent from the wealth of the shareholders, as ap- 
pears in the legislator's acknowledgment of the rules of the project of 
a Code of civil transactions, which is near completion. . .-119 
On the other hand, the larger picture is governed by the princi- 
ples of the shari'a, which the Court mentions extensively obiter.120 It 
results, as cited above, in the conclusion that "the shareholders are 
liable in their own assets for payment of the debt." 
The Abu Dhabi Court of Cassation, in a more recent decision, 
also upheld a decision in appeal in which "partners... will be jointly 
liable even if the company was a limited liability company."'121 The 
Court, however, based its ruling on the fact that the shareholders in 
the company in question could not avail themselves of the limitation 
to their liability because the company had not been properly 
registered. 
CAPITAL MARKETS 
While all these borderline cases illustrate the dilemma caused by the 
fact that the classical legal system did not know any limitation on 
liability, a second derivation of the classical system's legacy may be 
118. At 312. Emphasis added. 
119. At 311. 
120. Full text at 311. 
121. MELCR 1, 1995, 26, report of Essam Al Tamimi. 
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illustrated in the difficulty to find effective stock exchanges in the 
Middle Eastern Muslim world. 
As a general pattern, most trading in commercial papers or 
otherwise takes its course in discreet, private, environments. On oc- 
casions, secondary market places appear as de facto stock exchanges, 
but there is much to achieve in terms of volume and of business prac- 
tices before a solid stock exchange starts functioning in the region, a 
fact confirmed by the noted absence of a value-added oil derivatives 
market in the Gulf.122 Where a relative experience briefly developed, 
as in Kuwait, the collapse was prompt. In Suk al-Manakh, an infor- 
mal financial market rose in the 1970s, but the whole structure col- 
lapsed in the circularity of inflated commercial paper trading in 
1982.123 A similar collapse took place in the Tel-Aviv stock exchange 
in October 1983, but stricter regulations have since been 
introduced.124 
Indication of the difficulty faced by stock exchanges can be found in 
the dearth of good research in the subject in the Arab world. To my 
knowledge, no serious publications are available in Arabic, despite 
well-attended meetings of a number of Arab capital markets 
conferences. 
Two exceptions-in English-will confirm the rule: one is an ES- 
CWA regional report, which notes that "most of the stock markets in 
the Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (ESCWA) re- 
gion are still in their infancy, lacking experience and with a relatively 
underdeveloped status, particularly in terms of laws, regulations and 
accounting systems."'25 "In terms of performance," the report ex- 
plains, "most stock markets in the ESCWA region are highly specula- 
tive and thus volatile. This imperfection stems partly from their 
status as underdeveloped, as lack of data and economic information 
in public shareholding companies give room to speculation and 
anticipation."126 
122. Fadel Chalabi, "Mustaqbal al-naft fil-sharq al-awsat (the future of oil in the 
Middle East)," in Al-muqawwimat al-fikriyya wal-qanuniyya li-nizam sharq-awsati jadid (the intellectual and legal frameworks for a new Middle East), conference held 
at SOAS, London 19-20 december 1994, Proceedings, 7. 
123. Fadwa Adel Darwiche, The Gulf Stock Exchange Crash: The Rise and Fall of 
the Souq Al-Manakh (1986), for a popularized view. The fallout was evaluated at $40 
billion. 
124. On the early experience of the Israeli "emerging market," see Abdo Kadifa & Chibli Mallat, The Third Stage of Zionism: High Technology in Israel, Centre of Near 
and Middle Eastern Studies (SOAS, University of London), occasional paper 1, May 
1988. 
125. ESCWA Stock markets in the ESCWA region, New York 1995, 1. (United Na- 
tions, E/ESCWA/ED/1995/3/Add.1, 4 december 1995, hereinafter ESCWA report). ES- CWA countries are Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Palestine, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syrian Arab Republic, United Arab Emirates and Yemen. 
126. Id., at 1. 
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In terms of "legal, regulatory and institutional frameworks," the 
report divides the countries under study into three groups. One group 
is that of the wealthy oil states with 'capital surplus', and includes 
countries like Kuwait, Oman and Bahrain which are in the process of 
"developing the necessary institutional and regulatory structures, 
starting with the stock exchange." At the time of the report, Qatar 
and the UAE were still considering the establishment of stock mar- 
kets, but Qatar has since adopted a law127 and opened up the Doha 
stock exchange in May 1997. Among the capital surplus countries, 
Saudi Arabia has "opted for a screen-based floorless securities trad- 
ing mechanism managed by a specialized department in the Saudi 
Arabia Monetary Agency," which is the equivalent of a central bank. 
Beyond the formal institutions, one is still hard pressed to find the 
premises of a really independent stock exchange in operation in any 
of those countries. 
Nor is it, one should conclude from the report, much more hope- 
ful in the rest of the jurisdictions surveyed: countries like Syria, 
Libya and Iraq do not have the minimal basis of free trade that would 
allow the consideration of stock exchanges, and the establishment in 
Baghdad of a stock exchange in 1992 is a particularly cruel example 
of facade modernism in a country which is as closed upon itself eco- 
nomically as it is isolated internationally. 
A more hopeful experience may be found in the third group iden- 
tified by the report. It includes Jordan, Egypt and Lebanon (and, 
outside the ESCWA remit, Tunisia and Morocco). In these countries, 
the search for stock exchanges is premised on the opening up to for- 
eign capital and the prevailing sense within the authorities that do- 
mestic stock markets have a key role to play in financing economic 
growth. When one looks at the figures of market capitalization, how- 
ever, and those of listed companies an their growth, the experiment 
remains paltry even in comparison to developing markets in 
neighbouring Pakistan and India, or further afield in South East 
Asia: "The ESCWA region's stock markets represented in 1993 only 
0.6 per cent of the total capitalization of the world's stock markets, 
while the region's GDP represented about 1.3 per cent of the world's 
total."128 As for listings on the stock exchanges, there were 1,204 
listed companies in the stock markets of the region in 1993, which 
"represented only 8.2 % of that of the emerging markets and 6.8 % of 
the developed markets." These figures must be further mitigated by 
the fact that very few companies listed are active. In most Arab coun- 
tries with a stock exchange, the listing of seriously active companies 
127. Reference in Najeeb al-Nauimi, "Qatar," in Yearbook of Islamic and Middle Eastern Law iv, 371-73 (1997-98). 
128. ESCWA report, at 8. 
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rarely reaches the two-digit figure. Even then, only a small part of 
the companies' share is on offer. 
Among the countries described by the ESCWA report as closer to 
an operational stock exchange, we have a comprehensive policy study 
explaining the pitfalls facing both the private and public efforts to 
establish an effective framework for the development of Lebanon's 
capital markets.129 It is useful to examine some of its conclusions. 
In Lebanon, both the central bank and the stock exchange are 
heavily dependent on governmental regulations, as they would be in 
any other country; but they are more top-heavy due to the overbear- 
ing intervention of the government in the institutional framework of 
the Central Bank and the Beirut Stock Exchange (hereinafter, after 
its French appellation, "the Bourse"). For all intents and purposes, 
the Bourse exists only on paper. The Central Bank is a sprawling and 
powerful institution. 
The main problems of the stock exchange are clearly underlined 
in the report. The Bourse was created in 1920 and, after several 
amendments through to 1985, the "development in the legislative 
framework did not improve the Bourse perspectives which remained 
very narrow and marginal thus unable to channel short-term capitals 
into medium and long-term credits via stocks and bonds. .. In fact 
statistics show that since the early 60s and till the mid-70s at the 
outbreak of the war, the yearly volume of transactions in the Bourse 
did not exceed 0,70 % at best of the total volume of deposits in the 
banking sector. In most cases, this ratio stood at less than 0,60 %."130 
As a result, the Bourse suspended its activities in 1983, with only 46 
firms being quoted, and, in effect, trading remaining concentrated in 
a mere 15 companies. 
For this ineffectiveness, the authors of the report mention sev- 
eral reasons, to which they suggest legal and financial correctives: 
one problem is the closed system of companies "owned either by a 
very small number of persons or at best by families," who have few 
problems raising money with the commercial banking sector, itself - 
one may add - aflush with oil money in the 1970s, and itself sharing 
its directors and executives with the larger Lebanese industrial 
firms. 
As for the commercial code, which was promulgated in the early 
1940s, it is not developed enough to accommodate the emergence of 
new and more sophisticated tools in financial markets across the 
world. In addition, the authors note "the absence of an effective su- 
pervisory authority," although when one looks at the structure of the 
Bourse, governmental input through the ministry of finance and the 
129. Nasser Saidi & Samir Nasr, The Development of Lebanon's Capital Markets (1995). 
130. Id., at 285. 
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'committee in charge of the Bourse' would indicate that the govern- 
ment has actually stifled the system through a bureaucratic network 
of controls. More pointed is the remark that "shareholding companies 
have not respected the principle of transparency in their accounting 
practices and financial statements."'13 
What are the suggested reforms? In part, the authors may be 
enlarging governmental meddling by suggesting, inter alia, the crea- 
tion of a control commission whose main mission would be to guard, 
protect and control the safety and regularity of operations. They also 
advise the government to "enlarge the Exchange Committee by in- 
cluding people with financial and economic expertise in it," to "amend 
the Beirut Exchange Laws and enact the necessary laws in the Code 
of Commerce to improve the role of public joint-stock companies at 
the expense of personal or family-owned one." 
This is easier said than done, and the multiplication of laws and 
by-laws as well as the appointment of more bureaucrats "with finan- 
cial and economic expertise" does not necessarily decrease the over- 
bearing control of the Ministry of Finance.132 But mostly, "personal 
or family owned" companies make up the basic social structure of 
capital ownership in Lebanon. The intertwined complex of family 
politics, clientelism and power, makes it difficult to see closely family- 
controlled companies giving way to the anonymous dynamic of a 
stock exchange. As for the creation of fiscal incentives to open up such 
companies to professional accounting, which has already been under- 
taken by a vast overhaul of company taxation law, and the lowering 
of rates across the board to 10% of company profits and 5% of divi- 
dends,133 it will take some time for them to filter down the system in 
order to effect company transparency hoped for by the authors. That 
is, if low taxation of companies remains. 
A more important hurdle in Lebanon is the sacrosanct banking 
secrecy law, which remain beyond the contemplation of legislative re- 
form. In the absence of the possibility for the government to investi- 
gate the financial system under the secrecy law, one is hard put to 
find a solution to the multi-layered throttle to anonymous capital, 
which is the backbone of any stock exchange. 
The survey of Lebanon's prospects for serious capital markets 
shows the continued limitations which face the Middle Eastern legis- 
lator in this field. Despite the hopes expressed in the policy report, 
which was finalised in late 1994, it is hard to find any determined 
follow-up to the wide range of measures therein suggested: 
131. Id., at 286-87; on government custody and organisation of the Bourse, see also 
292-95. 
132. Supra n. 129, at 299-300. 
133. See Mallat, "Lebanon," in Yearbook of Islamic and Middle Eastern Law, i, 
216-17 (1994). 
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The authorities will be proposing legislation to enact a com- 
prehensive Capital Markets Law. A Beirut Capital Markets 
Board (BCMB), set up as an independent authority under 
the capital markets law, would have overall responsibility 
for the organisation, regulation, supervision and control of 
markets, participants and securities. The BCMB would have 
a large degree of autonomy and independence in setting pol- 
icy for the financial markets and their development, similar 
to the 'Banque du Liban' in determining monetary policy. Its 
governing board would have the equivalent of ministerial 
status. This independence from government is important for 
ensuring long-term financial market stability. An independ- 
ent Beirut Capital Markets Commission (BCMC)-account- 
able to the BCMB-would act as the supervisory authority 
and industry 'watchdog'. Broadly, there will be three organi- 
zations: the Beirut Stock Exchange (BSE), the Beirut Money 
Market (BMM) and a central depository and clearing 
organisation.134 
Of these, only the Bourse had started again, in 1995, after con- 
siderable infighting between its would-be directors, and its activity 
dwarfed by the secondary market until the listing of the shares of the 
country's largest company on the Bourse.l35 But even then, the close 
association of the company with a narrow political circle of govern- 
ment officials has kept the ties between market and political clout 
dangerously intertwined. Regardless of the fate of one company, one 
thing is certain: so long as the most serious sector in the economy of 
Middle Eastern countries, that of banking and big industry, including 
oil, remains outside the structure of the stock exchange or of secon- 
dary markets, it is unlikely that capital markets will in turn appear 
serious. 
This is not for lack of some circles wanting the development of these 
markets across the region, who need a more fluid capitalisation of the 
economy. For private foreign investment, the absence of a stock ex- 
change prevents an exit strategy, and deters large-scale financing. 
Nor, considering petrodollars, is the absence of mature stock ex- 
changes simply a matter of available liquidities. 
One of the possible explanations may be function of the profound 
individualism in the tradition of Islamic law, which is manifested in 
the difficulty to find in the classical age anonymous shareholders' 
134. Saidi & Nasr, supra n. 129, at 22-23. 
135. Solidere, which is the 1991-established Lebanese Company for the Develop- 
ment and Reconstuction of Beirut Central District, with a capital of almost 1.9 billion dollars. It traded in secondary markets until 1996, when it was formally listed in the Bourse. See Mallat, "Lebanon," cited above n.133, 216; see also G. Mahmassani, "Law 
and Reconstruction in Lebanon," in Lewis Ruttley & Mallat, supra n. 108, at 39-73, at 50-55. 
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partnerships. Since the paragon partnership engages only two par- 
ties as in the partnership for profit and loss,136 which typically en- 
gage them in a single transaction, no limited liabilities companies 
have seen the light in the classical age. 
This, however, must be a guarded conclusion. Without more care- 
ful research, the absence of effective stock exchanges cannot be sim- 
ply limited to a Weberian-like explanation by way of the dominance 
of legal "individualism" in business for the Muslim world. As noted by 
the two available studies on stock markets, a healthy and diversified 
listing of companies with minimal transparency is required. Still, one 
may legitimately wonder whether the legacy of a Middle Eastern 
legal pattern which snobs anonymity or limited liability might not 
constitute the larger hurdle to the emergence of a successful stock 
exchange. 
Another factor in contemporary societies is the extensive statist 
tradition in most "socialist" countries of the post-independence era, 
like Naser's Egypt, and Syria and Iraq under the Ba'th. In historical 
terms, the oldest stock exchange appeared in Egypt, which never de- 
veloped in any significant manner besides the commercial market 
represented by the industry of cotton in Alexandria.137 That experi- 
ence did not outlast the Naserite period, and it is no coincidence that 
talk of a stock exchange happened only with the so-called economic 
opening up - the infitah - which timidly started in the 1980s.138 Nor 
are the Gulf states less statist-oriented, in their own way, as rentier- 
type oil economies slow down the creation of independent and diversi- 
fied markets. 
Whatever the reasons, it is significant that all attempts to organ- 
ise stock exchanges have remained constrained by both the volume of 
the transactions and the effective participation of shareholders. 
This did not prevent many bourses from finding their way to the 
statute books across the Middle East. Even buildings have been dedi- 
cated for their purpose, but the stock exchanges have not yet out- 
grown their vacuous shells. 
136. On companies in classical Islam, the standard work is by Abraham Udovitch, 
Partnership and Profit in Medieval Islam (1970). 
137. The oldest organised 'market/commercial exchange in the region was set up in Alexandria in 1861, and directed towards the sale of cotton and related manufac- 
turing and transport industries. By 1927, there were two cotton-related commercial 
exchanges sites in Alexandria, one in Khartum, and a stock exchange in Cairo. None 
is significant presently. See for the early regulation of stock exchanges in Egypt, 
Muhammad Amin Kamel Malash, Sharh qanun al-tijara (commentary on the com- 
mercial law), 2 vols, Cairo ca 1928, ii, 171-215. 
138. On which Hill, "Laws of investment, privatization and labour in Egypt," in Lewis Ruttley & Mallat, supra n. 108, at 115-51; Alan Richards & John Waterbury, A Political Economy of the Middle East (1991), chapter 9, 238-62: "The emergence of 
Infitah." 
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ISLAMIC BANKING 
Formally within company law, banking is at the heart of modern eco- 
nomic life, in the Middle East and elsewhere. Western-style banking, 
meant here in its capitalist and socialist-nationalized versions, domi- 
nates the region, where the main division operates between a nation- 
alised banking system such as in Iran, Egypt, Algeria, Syria, Iraq, 
Libya, and a private or mixed sector as in the Gulf states, Israel, Leb- 
anon, Morocco or Tunisia. 
This section does not intend to examine banking law in its domi- 
nant, western dimension, which generally follows the rules and regu- 
lations of older, well-established, western counterparts. Rather, 
attention is directed to the so-called phenomenon of "Islamic bank- 
ing," which emerged idiosyncratically in the early 1960s in rural 
Egypt, but which has expanded significantly since the mid-80s, 
whilst continuing to account for a mere fraction of commercial trans- 
actions conducted in western style: "As of early 1999, Islamic finan- 
cial institutions, including banks and non-banks (securities firms, 
mutual funds, insurance companies, etc.) were present in more than 
70 countries. Their assets exceeded the 200 billion dollars mark."139 
There is, considering this expansion, an understandably large 
literature on the subject, and several books have appeared in the past 
few years, some more felicitous than others. Of concern to this over- 
view is Islamic banking as a third 'derivative' product of the classical 
system in its contrast and competition with western commercial law. 
Unlike the problem of limited liability and the difficult emergence of 
stock exchanges, the Islamic banking phenomenon appears in a posi- 
tive form: the search for new institutions which incorporate a real or 
hypostatised Islamic financial tradition in which interest is shunned. 
The flight into Islamic banking is arguably one direct means 
which society has adopted to revive an abandoned commercial tradi- 
tion. The advocacy is a clear one, and runs along the following lines: 
let's go back to the tradition in its pure form, get rid of interest, and 
establish a riba-free Islamic banking system. With such an ambitious 
challenge, immediate problems were bound to arise, both on the gov- 
ernmental level and in private ventures. 
There is no dearth of hurdles on the way of Islamic banking. The 
root problem is anchored in the famous prohibition of riba, translated 
variably as interest or usury, which offers the more spectacular side 
of unease between the classical and the modern traditions. Once riba 
is defined as "interest," any modern banking transaction runs the 
risk of contravening Qur'anic prescriptions, and undermining the 
139. From Ibrahim Warde, Islamic Finance in the Global Economy (forthcoming 
2000), quote from chapter one, section ii of the manuscript ("about statistics and per- formance assessments"). This promises to be the definitive critical study on Islamic 
banking and finance. 
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very basis of modern banking. A second problem is related to the 
structure of a limited company in the form of a bank, and the difficul- 
ties resulting from banking transactions which this company is des- 
tined to carry out or facilitate. 
It is in this context that both private institutions and govern- 
ments have been grappling with the Islamic prohibition of riba. The 
prohibition of riba still dominates the entire field, and is illustrated 
in a seminal 1992 decision of the Pakistan Federal Shariat court.140 
On that occasion, which was understandably crucial for the whole 
economic system of a country priding its raison d'etre on the "purest" 
respect of the shari'a, a questionnaire was circulated by the court "to 
distinguished 'ulama, scholars, economists and bankers of the coun- 
try and abroad." (?18) It consisted of some sixteen questions, re- 
grouped under thirteen headings: 
1. What is the definition of Riba according to the Holy 
Qur'an and Sunnah of the Holy Prophet (p.b.u.h.). Does it 
cover the simple and compound interest existing in the pres- 
ent day financial transactions? 
2. If banking is based on interest-free transactions, what 
would be its basic practical shape in conformity with the In- 
junctions of Islam? 
3. (i) Does the interest on loans floated by the Government 
to meet national requirements Riba? 
(ii) What alternatives can be suggested for the banks in 
case they grant loans without interest for various 
requirements? 
4. Can, in the light of the Injunctions of Islam, any differen- 
tiation be made between private and public banking in re- 
spect of charging of interest on banking facilities for various 
services rendered? 
5. (i) Can the capital, according to the Injunctions of Islam, 
be regarded as an agent of production thus requiring re- 
muneration for its use? 
(ii) Does devaluation of the currency affect the payment 
of loans taken before such devaluation? 
(iii) Can inflation causing rise in the cost/value of gold 
and consumer goods in term of currency have any effect 
on the sum borrowed? 
6. What would be the alternatives in the context of present 
day economic conditions to carry on domestic and foreign 
140. Mahmood-ur-Rahman Faisal v. Secretary, Ministry of Law, PLD 1992 FSC 1, 
also published as a separate book, Federal Shariat Court judgment on interest (riba), Lahore 1992, including the decision (pp.1-188) and Appendices (pp.1-159). The deci- 
sion is hereinquoted following its division in paragraphs. 
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trade efficiently without availing of banking facilities based 
on interest? 
7. Is interest permissible or other wise on the transactions 
between two Muslim States or a Muslim and non-Muslim 
State? 
8. Is it possible to carry on insurance business otherwise 
that on the basis of interest? 
9. Does interest accruing to the Provident Fund come under 
Riba? 
10. Can the payment of prize money on Prize Bond of Saving 
Bank Account or other similar Schemes be regarded as Riba? 
11. Would it be lawful under Islamic Law to differentiate be- 
tween business loans on which interest may be charged and 
consumption loans which should be free of interest? 
12. If interest is fully abolished, what would be the induce- 
ments in an Islamic Economic System to provide incentives 
for saving and for economising the use of capital? 
13. Can an Islamic State impose any tax on its subjects 
other than Zakat and Ushr? 
The answers to the questionnaire were reproduced in a full book- 
length appendix of some 143 pages,141 and were extensively used by 
the court itself to consider un-Islamic no less than twenty major 
Pakistani statutes, ranging from the Interest Act of 1839 to the 
Banking Ordinance of 1979. It is no surprise that the decision was 
frozen on appeal as it put in jeopardy a large number of legislative 
acts and risked undermining the whole banking system. Nor was this 
measure totally surprising in view of the fact that one of the strong- 
est advocates of full Islamization, the late General Zia-ul-Haq, had 
himself agreed to postpone the overhauling of the financial system 
several times. As the Court explained, "the question of interest was to 
remain outside the jurisdiction of the Federal Shari'at Court up to 
25th June, 1983... [T]he bar [was] to continue till 25th June, 1990. 
The said period having expired the bar stood removed and the juris- 
diction with regard to examining any provision of any fiscal law or 
any law relating to the levy and collection of taxes and fees or bank- 
ing, insurance practice and procedure now vests in this Court." (?63) 
The long court decision, written by Chief Justice Dr. Tanzil-ul- 
Rahman, did not strictly follow, or answer, all the questions it raised 
with the various experts. But the decision was premised throughout 
on a strict understanding of the prohibition of riba as equivalent to 
the prohibition of interest in whatever forms it may manifest itself. 
141. Id., Appendix A, 1-143. 
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The reasoning proceeds in several phases: it starts with an expla- 
nation of the stakes in the case, the procedure of the Court including 
the call for expert witnesses and the aforementioned questionnaire, 
and the history of the prohibition of riba in principle since the 1956 
Constitution of Pakistan through to the final empowerment of the 
Federal Shariat Court to review the matter in June 1990. 
Next is examined the definition of riba (?65 ff.). There is little 
original in the long section.142 The Court covers the instances in 
which the word appears in the Qur'an and in the hadith, noting how- 
ever that "riba al-fadl is outside the scope of the present discussion." 
(?71) The expose culminates in the rejection of the alleged distinction 
between interest in consumer transactions, for which riba would be 
strictly forbidden, and interest in productive loans, where it could be 
tolerated: "[W]hen the Holy Qur'an prohibited interest, it applied to 
the interest on commercial loans for productive purposes as well as to 
the interest on consumptional loans." (?45) 
Examining further the issue of riba, the Court went through var- 
ious techniques associated with the interpretation of Islamic law, in- 
cluding the consideration of consensus (ijma', ?125 ff) and "weal," 
(maslaha, ?140 ff). It concluded on the latter that "the rule of Mas- 
laha can't be invoked in aid to permissibility of 'Bank Interest"' 
(?152), and on the former that: 
?137. As it has been explained in the earlier part of the judg- 
ment there are two types of Riba : (1) Riba al-Nasiah and (2) 
Riba al-Fadal. Presently in these petitions we are concerned 
with Riba al-Nasiah i.e., the interest charged on the money 
lent or in other words the addition over and above the princi- 
pal sum advanced on loan. It includes all kinds of interest 
irrespective of the fact whether the rate stipulated is high or 
low and whether the interest is or is not added to the princi- 
pal sum after fixed periods and whether the sum lent is for 
production or consumption purposes. So far this kind of Riba 
is concerned we have not come across any difference of opin- 
ion regarding its prohibition. There is no Commentator of 
the Holy Qur'an, no narrator of Ahadith, and no Jurist of 
Islamic Fiqh worth the name who has even expressed or 
even mentioned any doubt regarding any obscurity or ambi- 
guity in its meaning. The difference of opinion whatever is 
found is regarding 'Riba al-fadal' and that is out of discus- 
sion in the context of Bank interest which is under our 
consideration. 
142. On the discussion of riba, Warde, supra n. 139, at chapter 3; Abdullah Saeed, Islamic Banking and Interest: a Study of the Prohibition of Riba and its Contemporary 
Interpretation (1997), Nabil Saleh, Unlawful Gain and Legitimate Profit in Islamic Law (1986, 2nd ed. 1992); and the two articles mentioned supra n. 33. 
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The most interesting section in the decision concerns the two last 
items which the Court discussed before proceeding with the invalida- 
tion of the Pakistani statutes concerned by the prohibition of interest. 
One argument which it gave particular attention to was inflation 
and/or indexation as a possible exception to the strict application of 
the riba rule. If money depreciates, according to those tenants of a 
lenient view of banking which the court opposes, or if, alternatively, 
indexation is possible by contract or by state regulation, then why 
should the value of the money lent, rather than the fixed quantity, 
not be taken into account? 
Several legal and policy matters are examined to refute the argu- 
ment, most prominently the need to avoid manifest injustice by al- 
lowing creditors to be abused by debtors if they are paid back with 
the original amount of money in the loan, while repayment is worth 
several times less in real value. In answer to that argument, the 
Court resorted to general principles of tort law, including the princi- 
ple that "the usurper will not be required to indemnify the loss 
caused to the value of the property or money as a result of a fall in its 
price." (?196), and to more general principles of equity ("an evil ... 
should not be redressed by a similar or a bigger evil," ?176) and policy 
considerations:143 "Why should a lender be protected against infla- 
tion while the borrower is not similarly protected against 
deflation?"144 
In the rich, albeit sometimes repetitive, argumentation, the most 
interesting passages occur when the Court is at odds with recent 
Pakistani case-law: 
?231 For the above discussion, we would approve the three 
decisions reported as Messrs Bank of Oman Ltd. v.Messrs 
East Trading Co. Ltd. and others, Irshad H. Khan v. Mrs. 
Parveen Ajaz and Habib Bank Ltd. v. Muhammad Hussain 
and others (P L D 1987 Kar. 404, 466 and 612) and respect- 
fully dissent with the above-cited judgment reported as Aijaz 
Haroon v. Imam Durrani ( P L D 1989 Kar.304) as also 
adopted by the learned Judge in Tyeb v. Messr Alph Insur- 
ance Co. Ltd. and others (1990 C L C 428) to the extent of 
allowing an additional amount on loan based on indexation 
on account of inflation. 
The views of Justice Wajihuddin Ahmed, the author of Tyeb v. 
Messr Alph Insurance Co. Ltd. and others, are the object of the Fed- 
eral Shariat Court detailed rejection. In his decision, the Karachi 
143. Even though it asserts the prevalence of Islamic law over any economic theo- 
ries: "The arguments given in support of indexation are mostly based on some eco- 
nomic principles and do not relate to Shari'ah." (Mahmood-ur-Rahman, ?177). 144. Id., ?228, quoting an article by Munawar Iqbal, presented at a seminar held in Pakistan in 1987. 
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judge relied on the 19th century treatise of the Hanafi jurist Ibn 
'Abidin, who appears to argue the need to repay the lender with "the 
real worth of the currency, which was the subject-matter of or for 
which the contract was concluded."145 
The original text of the Levantine Ibn 'Abidin is not without a 
dose of uncertainty, which the great 19th century jurist acknowl- 
edges in an attempt, at the end of his short treatise, to find a middle 
way between a buyer and a seller who agree on a currency worth less 
when payment is due than its real value at the time of the con- 
tract.'46 All the arguments in between the acknowledgment of infla- 
tion and the danger on the certainty of contracts, together with a 
detour into the habits of merchants, can be found in that treatise. 
They were reflected in the opposing views of the Pakistani courts. 
Many of the problems associated with Islamic banks have been an- 
nounced-though hardly solved-in the Federal Shariat Court deci- 
sion. Meanwhile, the number of private Islamic banks has increased 
dramatically over two decades, and their assets are real. Even west- 
ern banks operating in the Middle East have quickly re-adjusted with 
the establishment of "Islamic portfolios." 
Islamic banks have mushroomed in the past twenty years, but 
the picture is still patchy. In some cases, as in some such enterprises 
in Egypt, failure has befallen the bank and given rise to the interven- 
tion of the government to offer protection to the small depositors.147 
In other countries, more success has been forthcoming, although 
the essential operations of the banks have tended to be directed to- 
wards short-term financing of international trading. 
For private institutions (and individuals), the challenge is to set 
up a system of banking which does not acknowledge any form of fixed 
fee on any transaction. A deposit or a loan of, say, 9% yield per an- 
num would be illegal. To replace it, and yet to retain the basic func- 
tion of banking, the alternative generally proposed is for a financial 
institution to pay its depositors with a share of its annual profit in a 
way which is akin to a distribution of dividends to the shareholders of 
a company. Under that 'first-tier' of the mudaraba contract (the Ro- 
man commenda, known also as "partnership for profit and loss"), the 
depositors would in effect be shareholders, and the return on the 
money deposited with the bank will not be previously fixed, so as to 
prevent the deposit from being tainted with the illegal riba. Simi- 
145. Cited ?59 in the original decision, reproduced in Mahmood-ur-Rahman, ?210. 146. Ibn 'Abidin, Majmu'at rasa'el (collected treatises), 2 vols, Beirut n.d., ii, 57-67. 147. On the experience of the so-called sharikat tawzif al-amwal ('Islamic' invest- 
ment companies) in Egypt, see Warde, supra n. 139, at chapter 4 section 4, "new forms of Islamic finance," and literature cited. 
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larly, in the loan extended by the bank to borrowers, the profit of the 
bank would be function of the success of the project. The bank would 
enter in a contract of mudaraba with the borrower-entrepreneur, and 
would share in the success or failure of the project for which funds 
were extended. Thus the concept of a "two-tier mudaraba."'48 
The mudaraba is the prime vehicle under which the theoreti- 
cians of Islamic banks, following the Egyptian mufti Muhammad 
'Abduh at the turn of the century,149 through to Muhammad Baqer 
al-Sadr in 1969,150 see the basic relationship in an Islamic bank be- 
tween depositors, the borrowers and the bank. 
The organization of a dual system of mudaraba contracts as a 
basic model for the Islamic bank appears straight enough under this 
scheme.151 Things are not so simple, however, and one of the basic 
difficulties at the confluence of Islamic and contemporary banking is 
the idea of the bank itself. The reason why Islamic banking has been 
so unpalatable to the western model is precisely because a depositor 
in the Islamic scheme is normally not entitled to receive a return on 
his deposit whilst protecting his capital-his initial deposit. A loss 
incurred by the bank will eat up the depositor's capital, the mere 
existence of which cannot be guaranteed under the scheme of 
mudaraba. In addition to the complication of a classical Islamic sys- 
tem in which "the concept of corporate existence" was not available, 
the agent in the traditional contractual arrangement, "was not liable 
for any part of the investment in case of loss."152 Since that agent in 
the classical contract is none other than the bank in a modern Islamic 
set-up, the initial worries of the governor of the Bank of England, 
who rejected the mere idea of an Islamic "bank" in Britain are under- 
standable.l53 In another early appreciation of the basics in the sys- 
148. Frank Vogel & Samuel Hayes, Islamic Law and Finance. Religion, Risk and 
Return 130-31 (1998): "A first-tier mudaraba is created when investors (we shall call 
them 'depositors') place their capital with an Islamic bank, fund, or other financial 
institution, which here acts as the mudarib or working partner. The financial institu- 
tion or mudarib in turn invests these funds with entrepreneurs (the equivalent of a 
conventional bank's borrowers) by means of second-tier mudarabas, in which the Is- 
lamic financial institution now has the role of capital investor. .. The institution's 
profits then come not from interest income but from a percentage of the profits from 
the second-tier mudarabas." 
149. On which, Mallat, "The debate on riba," 69-74. 
150. Cited supra n. 58. The banking contributions of Sadr are discussed in Mallat, The Renewal at 169-87. 
151. This 'two-tier mudaraba system' is the dominant alternative scheme in the- 
ory. One should note, however, that a more elaborate system was presented by Muhammad Baqer al-Sadr in his early treatise on the Islamic-free bank. Sadr sug- 
gests a one-tier system in which the depositor and the entrepreneur would be the two 
parties to the contract, with the bank acting only as intermediary. See my discussion in The Renewal, at 169-73. 
152. Udovitch, supra n. 136, at 239, citing several authorities. 
153. For Robin Leigh-Pemberton, then governor of the Bank of England, Islamic 
banking is "a perfectly acceptable mode of investment, but it does not fall within the 
long established and well understood definition of what constitutes banking in this 
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ter, an American regulatory official had clearly shown the 
limitations of the system under U.S. law: "The principle of operating 
as a partner, in which profits and losses of enterprises are shared, 
appears sufficiently at odds with U.S. practice and regulations as to 
make it unlikely that the Islamic financial institutions can operate 
here as commercial banks or thrift institutions. In addition, the pro- 
hibition of interest, while itself occasioning little or no regulatory ob- 
jection, would appear to represent a substantial competitive 
disadvantage for such institutions."154 
On the practical level, another significant problem arises from 
the marginal place of mudaraba in self-styled Islamic banks. Under 
the most optimistic accounts, mudaraba schemes represent less than 
10% of banking operations.155 Instead, the main vehicle or "product" 
of Islamic banks is the so-called murabaha, which is none other than 
a facilitation by the bank of short-term loans, mostly in commercial 
export-import operations, for their most trusted clients.156 While var- 
ious exotic appellations are labelled unto a basic scheme facilitating 
short-term sale, the legal vehicle is hardly original, or revolutionary. 
More seriously, for a financial system that prides itself on offering 
"full" banking facilities from an Islamic perspective, it does not corre- 
spond to any particularly original scheme. 
Finally, and on the level of governments, some countries have 
attempted to cleanse the macro-economic banking system from riba. 
Riba-free legislation was passed, but the picture is also uncertain, 
especially with regard to the fact that the whole banking system is 
often under public ownership control. The still unimplemented deci- 
sion of the Pakistan Federal Shariat Court shows the difficulty facing 
any modern Middle Eastern legislation in that central economic 
field.157 
country." Speech given at the Arab Bankers Association, London, 2 October 1984. 
The only 'Islamic bank' allowed for a while in Britain was eventually shut down. 
154. Charles Schotta, "Islamic banking and the U.S. regulatory climate," in Pro- 
ceedings, Islamic banking and finance conference, Washington DC, 25-26 September 
1986, 1. Schotta was featured as 'deputy assistant secretary of the treasury for Ara- bian Peninsula affairs.' 
155. E.g., Vogel & Hayes, supra n. 148, at 135. 
156. "'Mark-up' transactions account for 80 to 95% of all investments by Islamic financial institutions. The best-known mark-up instrument is the murabaha, a cost- 
plus contract in which a client wishing to purchase equipment or goods requests the financial provider to purchase the items and sell them to him at cost plus a declared 
profit. It is thus a financing-cum-sale transaction: the bank purchases the required 
goods directly and sells them on the basis of a fixed mark-up profit, agreeing to defer the receipt of the value of the goods (although the goods can be delivered immedi- 
ately)." Warde, supra n. 139, chapter 7 section 1, "Murabaha and other mark-up 
schemes." 
157. For an excellent survey of the various countries, Warde, supra n. 139, at chap- ters 3-6; for the regulatory challenges under the new 'global' system of banking, see 
chapters 7-11. 
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Islamic banking is a recent phenomenon, which indicates the im- 
portance of the shari'a in the most basic set-up of the banking system 
in the private as well as public sectors. Although the experiment is 
not developed enough for an assessment of its durability, it is fair to 
say that it has countered western banking with an unusual intellec- 
tual challenge. In the overall commercial field however, the ultimate 
dominance of western-style law still prevails, despite what a rich- 
though patchy-Islamic tradition of classical commercial law seems 
to offer. 
ARBITRATION 
If Islamic banking is to be partly perceived as the revenge of classical 
law from the point of view of substance, another form of the tradi- 
tion's revenge may be taking place, procedurally, in arbitration. Here, 
the object of the revenge may have focused more on the state and the 
slowness of its judicial system than on the revival of classical 
concepts. 
This is an area which is obviously not confined to commercial 
cases, but the interest in arbitration has been primarily one of com- 
mercial lawyers in the past few years, and institutional anchors on a 
national and regional level are primarily sought by merchant and law 
practitioners. 
An appreciation of the arbitration process in the Arab world re- 
quires a return to basics. The basics here are Weberian: it is the state 
which has the exclusive right to exercise coercion, including violence. 
It is judicial power which wields, through the rule of law, the most 
sophisticated manifestation of state coercion. There is no rule of law 
without state monopoly of violence. 
This stands in sharp contrast with the philosophy of arbitration, 
which is a consensual process by nature, at all levels of the process. 
The arbitration process does not in theory require coercion. By sub- 
mitting to it rather than to the judge, the parties accept in principle 
the result of the award. Here, however, matters become in a Middle 
Eastern Arab context particularly complicated, and the whole Weber- 
ian theory comes back to the fore with a vengeance. Arbitration re- 
mains an exception, in the settlement of intractable disputes, to the 
judicial process, and does not operate outside the framework of refer- 
ence imposed by the main rule, which is judge-made decisions. 
Weber's conclusions on state coercion offer the general back- 
ground to the first part of our proposition in this epilogue on commer- 
cial law: so long as the judicial process in the Arab world does not rise 
up to the extent needed to justify state monopoly over violence, its 
ersatz in the form of arbitration will remain faulty. This is true for 
domestic as well as international arbitration, of which the commer- 
cial dimension is the most important. 
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The second part of the proposition is that the flight into arbitra- 
tion will remain, despite all its shortcomings, the haven of merchants 
in search for a speedy settlement. 
Why do commercial litigants resort to arbitration rather than 
courts ? The simple answer is their wish to avoid the judicial system. 
Reasons may vary: the process in court may be too slow, too unpre- 
dictable, too open, too unreliable, or too expensive. 
Too slow: recourse to arbitration is the way to ensure, in theory, 
higher speed, as the informality of the arbitration procedure and the 
availability of the arbitrators appears to be far superior than any 
court would be able to sustain. 
Too unpredictable: arbitration may offer better predictability, or 
some more insurance or comfort for the parties, who are able to 
choose, rather than the unknown judge, at least one arbitrator to 
each party's liking. Presumably the parties choose persons of higher 
integrity and dedication than might be forced upon them by a wobbly 
judicial system. 
Too open: the arbitral process' closed or half-closed doors ensure 
improved discretion, which is particularly useful for business trans- 
actions. The award normally remains the property of the two parties, 
who might wish to keep it out of the public eye, for reasons connected 
or not with taxation or their preference to keep a low profile in busi- 
ness on litigation issues. 
Too unreliable: arbitration may offer, in terms of control over the 
process, increased reliability, which dovetails with speed and predict- 
ability. Arbitration is a one-instance process, whereas the three- 
stages of normal procedure, all the way to the supreme court, would 
suggest decisions which are overturned, quashed or weakened by dis- 
sent at various levels. 
Too expensive: arbitration can result in lesser costs for the liti- 
gants. Whilst sometimes prohibitive in international chambers of 
commerce for Middle Eastern litigants, costs tend to compare well in 
relative terms. A national or regional arbitral tribunal would nor- 
mally be cheaper to go to than the protracted process of local courts, 
and parties might dispose of lawyers altogether. While lawyers are 
usually needed in the arbitration of big commercial cases, the time 
factor of a quicker process brings overall costs down.158 
Each of these reasons, which are universal, applies more or less 
accurately in the Arab world, where the reliability of justice suggests 
contradictory manifestations of the rule of law. In a region which has 
158. For the marshalling of these basic arguments on the virtues of arbitration in a 
Middle Eastern context, see the explanatory memorandum (mudhakkara idahiyya) of the new Kuwaiti law on arbitration, Law 11, 1995, e.g., in al-Majalla al-lubnaniyya lil-tahkim al-'arabi wal-dawli (The Lebanese Review of Arab and International Arbi- 
tration), 1:1, 135-37 (1996). 
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been submitted to repeated and violent turmoil in the twentieth cen- 
tury, however, economic transactions (especially international trans- 
actions) have tended to be more equitably upheld than human rights 
law, the penal process or environmental grievances, both as a busi- 
ness ethics and as the subject of adjudication by the courts. This is 
not to say that the lack of authority of the courts in the constitutional 
field did not affect the less controversial arena of commercial law: the 
general system of patronage is rampant in the region. 
For all these reasons, the region has watched in the past decades 
a flight away from judicial adjudication and the consequent rise of 
arbitration. Arbitration has found great favour domestically and re- 
gionally, as it appears to offer obvious speed and simplicity in com- 
parison with the uncertain and costly court system. As law merchant, 
however, it is plagued at all levels by the diffidence of the judiciary. 
This diffidence must be understood against the frustrated back- 
ground of judicial office in most of the Middle East. 
Judges suffer in the region from a combination of executive med- 
dling, overwork, and low salaries. As a result, the judge, who should 
in theory be relieved by the advent of arbitrators to take some of his 
or her work off their plate, finds a glittering chunk of commercial law, 
typically involving commercial transactions with a large monetary 
significance, being diverted to wealthy lawyers, or worse, to retired or 
former judges. When some of the fees of the arbitrators are known, 
and the most basic comparison conjured up in the judge's mind with 
his own fixed remuneration, the result can only be diffidence. 
So unless the salaries of judges are increased to measure up with 
those an arbitrator of commercial transactions, the result is what we 
have in the region: an increased interest in arbitration, especially in 
commercial circles, to avoid the courts, and a proportionate and ris- 
ing diffidence from judges. This is compounded by the state's natural 
propensity to frown upon matters of importance which would be adju- 
dicated outside its control, and threaten its natural Weberian monop- 
oly of power. 
How is this diffidence illustrated in the legislation and court 
cases of the Arab Middle East? 
LEGISLATION 
Ever since the famous Aramco award, which pitted the government of 
Saudi Arabia against the American oil company,159 one lesson was 
159. The proceedings of the Aramco case leading to the award against Saudi Ara- bia were published in ten volumes, Arbitration between Government of Saudi Arabia 
and Arabian American Oil Company, n.p., 1956. The award upheld Aramco's position 
against the Saudi government by confirming the rights of the company to the exclu- 
sive transportation of Saudi oil protected in accordance with both Saudi and interna- 
tional law. 
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learnt by the wealthiest government in the Arab world: any adminis- 
trative contract, that is a contract involving the state or one of its 
branches, will not, by law, include an arbitration clause without ex- 
press permission from the Council of Ministers.160 Considering the 
importance of construction and other public contracts in the King- 
dom, this brings arbitration outside the pale of the most significant 
commercial transactions. 
Whilst the Saudi case may be extreme, legislation tends to create 
all kinds of typically procedural problems to arbitration. This is 
either done for special contracts of some commercial significance, like 
those related to agency and distribution, or in a more general 
manner. 
We have already discussed agency as a special area of commer- 
cial law, which dominated the rules and patterns of trade, and has 
led to special legislation designed to protect local importers by means 
of judicial compensation, in case of non-renewal of the contract, and 
administrative constraints to the appointment of a new agent by a 
foreign manufacturer. 
Within commercial agency law, the exceptional - or excessive - 
rules are reinforced procedurally, to avoid the drafting of agreements 
which bypass the restrictive legislation. 
Lebanon, which introduced the paragon commercial agency stat- 
ute in the Arab world under Decree Law 34/67, has also ensured that 
arbitration is kept at bay from adjudicating agency disputes: 
Notwithstanding any agreement to the contrary, the 
courts of the place of business of the commercial representa- 
tive shall be deemed to be competent to consider any dis- 
putes arising from the commercial representation 
contract.161 
It was left to commentators to try wiggling out of the public order 
clause by suggesting that arbitration could be initiated in Lebanon 
after the dispute had arisen.162 This public policy dimension, which is 
clearly averse to arbitration superseding the Lebanese law of com- 
mercial agency, has travelled in one way or the other to the Gulf 
along with the initial statute. In the Gulf, an arbitration arrange- 
ment can hardly be effective, in case of breach, when the administra- 
160. Decree 58 of 25 june 1963, discussed e.g., in A. Ahdab, Arbitration in the Arab 
Countries 602 (1990). Also Statute on Arbitration, Royal Decree M/46 of 12.07.1403 
H., corresponding 25 april 1983, Art. 3: "Government agencies are not allowed to re- 
sort to arbitration for settlement of their disputes with third parties except after hav- 
ing obtained the consent of the president of the Council of Ministers," and 
Implementation Rules, decree of the Council of Ministers 71, 2021/11, 8 september 
1405, corresponding 27 may 1985, Art. 8: "Where a government agency is a party to a 
dispute which it deems appropriate to refer to arbitration, [it must draft a memoran- 
dum which] must be approved by the president of the Council of Ministers." 
161. Art. 5, D-L 34/67. 
162. See e.g., Saleh, supra n. 81, at 3-39 to 3-41. 
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tive agencies themselves (typically the Minister of economy), are 
entitled to stop a new importer/dealer/agent from carrying out the 
agency so long as the conflict pending between the former agent and 
the foreign principal has not been settled. Whether rejected openly by 
legislation or hampered by administrative means, the uselessness in 
Lebanon of an arbitration clause in the initial agency contract is true 
of Bahrain, the UAE, Jordan, and Oman. The list is not comprehen- 
sive. As illustrated in a recent decision of the Court of cassation in 
Kuwait allowing an arbitration clause to stand, against an opposite 
conclusion in a similar case by the Lebanese court of appeal, the situ- 
ation of 'international arbitration and public order' is in a state of 
flux.163 
There is another, more general, form of adversity to commercial 
arbitration in national systems, especially when arbitration espouses 
an international form. This takes the shape of the difficulty to enforce 
an arbitration award, whether a domestic or an international one, in 
an Arab jurisdiction. Various agreements and treaties, including the 
Amman convention of 1987, or the New York convention of 1958, to 
which several jurisdictions have adhered, have tried to circumvent 
the problem on paper. 
Invariably, these treaties are undermined by 'public policy' con- 
siderations which the courts are all too prone to implement, and 
which the party that is dissatisfied with the award can put forward. 
There are various ways to do that, which are usually premised on 
public policy considerations, due process, the compulsory personal 
presence of both parties before the judges, and other constraining de- 
vices. These essentially procedural devices end up with the conflict 
carefully perused, if not effectively re-tried, by the local jurisdiction. 
In addition, there is a long string of statutes setting aside ar- 
bitration awards granted internationally, by freezing them, sub- 
jecting them to various appeals, or simply ignoring them. Some of 
the most recent such legislation can be found in Algeria,164 the 
UAE,165 Kuwait,166 Egypt,167 and Tunisia.168 The pattern of restric- 
tions is clear. 
163. The Kuwaiti decision is dated 6 february 1999, and is unreported. It allowed the arbitration clause between a foreign airfreight company and a local agent to 
stand, despite the fact that the arbitration was to be held in Beirut, not in Kuwait. In 
contrast, one Lebanese court of appeal rejected the application of an arbitration 
clause between a foreign company and its agent in Lebanon, ruling that the Lebanese 
courts were competent to adjudicate such disputes under the doctrine of public order, decision of 2 february 1999, reported in the daily al-Diyar, 23 may 1999, 24. 164. Legislative decree no. 93/09 of 25 april 1993, section iii, included in the civil 
code under Arts. 442 and 458 bis, (limitations under new Art. 442 of matters gener- 
ally under public policy, and matters of'legal persons governed by public law', general limitations under 458 bis.) Text in MECLR, 1, 1995, 33-36 (in English). 165. Arts. 203-218 of the Federal Law of Civil Procedure, e.g., Art. 235 considering the enforcement of foreign judgments and awards possible if "state courts have no jurisdiction in the dispute." See the strict application in a decision reported in 
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Statutes are not the only problem. Two comments on UAE and 
Omani practice show some of the problems facing the enforcement of 
foreign arbitration awards by the local courts: 
The UAE court [before which enforcement of the arbitral 
award is sought] will still review the process of serving sum- 
mons and notifying the party, especially if the arbitration 
award is challenged by the opponent party when an applica- 
tion is made to uphold the arbitration award by the UAE 
court. Further, a recent judgment delivered in the appeal of 
Indian Overseas Bank v. Ibrahim al Shirawi and others by 
the Dubai Court of Cassation is a matter relating to enforce- 
ment of a foreign judgment has thrown considerable doubt 
on whether a foreign arbitration award will be enforceable in 
the UAE.169 
This is also true in Saudi Arabia, where foreign judgments are 
frowned upon and tend to be set aside by courts.170 In a similar vein, 
a British barrister who has practised in Oman noted how "the status 
of foreign arbitral awards in Oman has been unclear, and, since the 
commercial judicature was constituted in its current form, more than 
ten years ago, there has been no case where direct enforcement of a 
foreign arbitral award has been granted."171 
A 1990 Court of Cassation case in Jordan will also serve as an 
illustration, a contrario, of jurisdictional diffidence to arbitration, 
MELCR 1:2, 1995, 73-4 and in Indian Overseas Bank v. Ibrahim Mohammed al- 
Shirawi, Cassation 117/1993 dated 20 november 1993, see infra n. 167. But see contra 
the upholding of a foreign arbitration clause, Basamah Marketing Establishment v. 
Aldaulia Marketing, Cassation 61/94, discussed in R. Price, supra n. Yearbook of Is- 
lamic and Middle Eastern Law ii (1995), at 207-08. 
166. Law 11, 1995, making the whole process of the arbitration tribunal particu- 
larly complicated, despite arguments to the contrary by the aforementioned Explana- 
tory Memorandum and the presentation by the representative of the Ministry of Justice in the proceedings of the Beirut Euro-arbitration seminar, December 1996, 
published as Muhammad Naser Nasrallah, "Tarikh al-tahkim bi-dawlat al-Kuwait 
wa anwa'uh (history and types of arbitration in the state of Kuwait)," al-Majalla al- 
lubnaniyya lil-tahkim al-'arabi wal-dawli, 3, 1996, 22-28 at 25-26. 
167. Law 27, 1994, vide Art. 58 on the inquisitive role of the courts as to parties 
and public policy. Text in in English in Yearbook of Islamic and Middle Eastern Law i, 
(1994), 500-17; in Arabic e.g., in al-Majalla al-lubnaniyya lil-tahkim al-'arabi wal- 
dawli, 1:1, 1995, 127-32. 
168. Law 42, 1993, vide Art. 81. Arabic text e.g., in al-Majalla al-lubnaniyya lil- 
tahkim, 1:1, 1996, 142-51 (But note the restriction of public policy to the concept un- 
derstood "under private international law"). 
169. Esam al-Temimi's comment on Indian Overseas Bank v. Ibrahim Mohammed 
al-Shirawi, cited supra n. 165, in MECLR, 3, 1996, 85; also discussed in Price, supra 
n. 22, at 330. 
170. Judgment of Diwan al-Mazalim reproduced in Lewis Ruttley & Mallat, supra 
n. 108, at 304-21. 
171. Alastair Hirst, "Court decisions on commercial arbitration in the Sultanate of 
Oman," MECLR, 2, 1995, 77-79, at 77. 
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even in internal matters. In that decision, the highest Jordanian 
Court confirmed the Court of Appeal's decision to reverse the Court of 
first instance in a case of arbitration between the municipality of the 
city of Basira and a public works company. The company had under- 
taken the building of a road which was not deemed conform to the 
specifications of the original contract. When the conflict arose in 1981 
on the fulfilment of contractual specifications, the two parties con- 
cluded an arbitration agreement, which resulted in 1986 in an award 
in favour of the municipality. The award was attacked before the 
court of first instance on several grounds, notably for lack of compe- 
tence of the head of the municipality in entering into an arbitration 
process, and, subsidiarily, because the arbitrators had overstepped 
the role given to them in the arbitration agreement. The Court of 
Cassation refused to be drawn into matters of fact which it consid- 
ered lower judges solely competent to look into, and upheld the Court 
of Appeal's decision. By a majority of two (out of three), it held on the 
second argument that "the court of appeal as court of fact, and follow- 
ing its competence in assessing evidence according to Articles 1/33 
and 1/34 of the law of evidence, had concluded that the Council of the 
city of Basira had agreed to arbitration." It further held that the Arbi- 
tration law of 1953 prevents the court from undermining an arbitral 
award except in specific and narrow cases, as when "the award had 
been issued on the basis of a void arbitral agreement, or if the award 
had overstepped the time limit specified in the agreement, or if the 
award had fallen outside the limits of the agreement." This assess- 
ment, the majority concluded, was a prerogative of the court of appeal 
as court of fact.172 
The dissenting judge approved this last conclusion, but consid- 
ered that the head of the Basira municipality did not have the right, 
in view of the Jordanian civil law and the law of municipalities, to 
enter into an arbitration agreement without an express authorisation 
from the municipality's Council.173 
One can see the resistance to a clear law, on a matter of domestic 
arbitration, both in the first instance court and from the dissenting 
judge. Of note, however, is the most important element in the pro- 
cess: time. Whilst the conflict arose in 1981, it took five years for an 
award to be granted, and a further four years to reach final approval 
in the judicial system. All five elements mentioned at the outset of 
this section were defeated, and Weberian monopoly of law and power 
returned, in the process, to the state through its judges. 
172. Al-Mamlaka al-urduniyya al-hashimiyya (the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan), Mahkamat al-tamyiz (court of cassation), 8 march 1990, MAFQ 12, 1992, 197-200, at 199. 
173. Id. at 200. 
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Another documented example from Jordan illustrates the time 
and speed factor involved in challenges to the arbitral award. In that 
case, the Court of Cassation had to streamline a procedurally compli- 
cated issue which arose from the stay of bankruptcy proceedings by a 
lower court after the decision by an arbitrator to dissolve a partner- 
ship. Two partners had started the original suit in 1977 against their 
fellow partner, and they asked the court to appoint a guardian of the 
partnership, which it did. But the three partners came to an agree- 
ment in court for the amicable dissolution of the partnership under 
the supervision of an arbitrator, who duly took on his task, and at- 
tached some of the land belonging to one of the plaintiffs to cover the 
liabilities of the partnership. A decision to stay the attachment pro- 
ceedings was granted, leading to the freezing of the whole dissolution 
process, with, as a result, the dragging on of the liquidation process 
for a decade. After various cross-appeals, the Court of Cassation 
brought some order into the process, explaining that the arbitration 
issue had been long decided upon by the courts, which had confirmed 
the liabilities of each of the parties in the partnership. The original 
plaintiff had therefore no business undermining the decision of the 
arbitrator, which had been confirmed by the Court, and the arbitra- 
tor's task was to continue unimpeded until full settlement of all the 
liabilities.174 
Here also, the dilatory procedural maneuvres of the party dissat- 
isfied with the arbitration are clear, and the extensive time needed 
for the Court to force the implementation of the award clearly defeats 
the primary purpose of the arbitral effort: speed. In the past few 
years, most jurisdictions in the Middle East have witnessed the diffi- 
cult but dogged efforts of those interested in the arbitration process. 
Considering the bottlenecks in legislation and case law, one is enti- 
tled to some scepticism on the future of effective arbitration. The 
proliferation of legislation, protocols, arbitration courts and centres, 
all vying to a place in the sun, if not supremacy, in the Arab world, 
may be more a sign of weakness than of strength. The absence of any 
serious reported arbitration in Rabat, despite a genuine attempt in 
the Amman convention of 1987 to set it up as a major and supreme 
center for arbitral awards, is one example of this pervasive reluc- 
tance. The move of the Court from Rabat to Cairo in 1994 may be the 
beginning of a different, perhaps more successful, re-centring. The 
structural problems remain, for court practice is not encouraging. 
Both the state generally and the judge, in particular, will try to re- 
claim control over the arbitral process. 
One way to avoid the shortcomings of arbitration includes the 
"new" field of alternative dispute resolution (ADR). The difference 
174. Al-Mamlaka al-urduniyya al-hashimiyya (the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan), Mahkamat al-tamyiz (court of cassation), 29 august 1992, MAFQ 16, 1994, 301. 
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with arbitration is well known: the person who presides over an ADR 
procedure will not issue an award. His or her goal is an agreement 
between the parties in conflict. This is the only way to avoid the pit- 
falls of implementation, since the parties who have just agreed on a 
compromise will also want it to be effective. There is no loser in ADR. 
Such an agreement being naturally binding, the whole dimension of 
the judicial or arbitral process is left behind. 
But then, is there a legal process at all ? In theory, such resolu- 
tion as may obtain in ADR is nothing else but the good old gentle- 
men's agreement. In practice, a combination of ADR, arbitration and 
judicial process might offer ways out of the present deadlock between 
judges and arbitrators in the Arab world. 
For lawyers in daily practice, the situation is the more dramatic 
since the Catch-22 situation imposes business rhythms which make 
of arbitration a dramatic need, helping to avoid the long and painful 
route imposed by the judicial process. But arbitration is constantly 
undermined: whilst the idea of pushing the arbitral process forward 
seems naturally compelling, it is difficult to imagine either state or 
judge getting enthusiastic about it. 
The more serious way out would be to bolster the judiciary. The 
more effective and comfortable the judiciary, the more a natural ally 
for the arbitrators, who take a lot of weight off the judges' back. But 
for arbitration to find a place in the sun, the financial and social im- 
balance cannot remain as dramatic as it is today. Frustrated judges 
will not readily give precedence to successful arbitrators. This is true 
for commercial arbitration, but no less true for any sort of informal 
process for the settlement of disputes. 
CONCLUSION: ON THE UNIVERSALITY OF THE LAW MERCHANT 
Commercial law is a field with the greatest propensity to elude syn- 
thesis. This is because the law of merchants is intrinsically attached, 
if it wishes to be successful, to the day-to-day practice of its strongest 
bearers and defenders, the merchants themselves. In a famous dic- 
tum of Lord Mansfield, the universality of law merchant was asserted 
in a case of admiralty: "The maritime law is not the law of a particu- 
lar country but the general law of nations: 'non erit alia lex Romae, 
alia Athenis; alia nunc, alia posthac; sed et apud omnes gentes et 
omni tempore, una eadem lex obtinebit'."175 
175. Luke v. Lyde, 97 Eng. Rep. 787 (1759), at 617: "It will not be the law of Rome, 
or the law of Athens; not one law now, one law herafter; but one and the same law, for 
all people and for all times." Quoted in my "Un comparatiste anglais au XVIIIeme 
siecle. Influences fran,aises sur la common law dans l'oeuvre de Lord Mansfield," Re- 
vue Historique de Droit Francais et Etranger, 72, 1994, 383-400, at 392; and in conclu- 
sion to Roy Goode, Commercial Law 1212 (1995). 
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If the dictum is true, at some abstract level, for all law as inter- 
preted and adjudicated by human beings, as in the original passage 
which Lord Mansfield borrowed from a reflection by Cicero on public 
law,176 the universality of law merchant is particularly true in an 
epoch of unprecedented globalisation of trade. While generalising 
models are possible at different times in history, and a model of trade 
practices as jelled into law detectable from Babylonian times, 
through to the classical age of Islam, the emergence of capitalist Eu- 
rope, and the establishment of the World Trade Organisation, some 
dilemmas have remained, as exciting and responseless as they were 
from the outset: the question of interest, excessive or otherwise, is 
one example. Another is the search for rapid solutions in business, 
through the court system, and if it fails, through a process of arbitra- 
tion. A third is a characteristic "dilemma of liability: the dilemma 
which most persistenly launches judges into speculation on the 
meaning of corporate entity is related to the liability of corporate 
members for obligations-contractual or tortious-that arise from 
corporate activities. This is the question that springs first to most 
lawyers' minds when 'corporate entity' is mentioned.'177 
For the lawyer indeed, geared as she is to problem-solving, the 
maze of commercial regulations may appear daunting against the 
mixture of systems and institutions in the Middle East. Fortunately, 
the guiding force for problem-solving remains the businessman's 
sense of expediency and achievement, and the protection which local 
merchants have imposed on their "agencies," against both the classi- 
cal system and the dominant patterns in Europe, are a case in point. 
That sense to cut through the law in search for solutions, or, what 
amounts to a close equivalent, profit, is eminently practical. In busi- 
ness, it is universal and overwhelming. 
176. Full passage in Cicero, De Republica, iii, 22. 
177. Conard, supra n. 102, at 424. 
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